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Abstract
A honeypot is a deception tool, designed to entice an attacker to compromise the
electronic information systems of an organization. If deployed correctly, a honeypot can serve as
an early-warning and an advanced security surveillance tool. It can be used to minimize the risks
of attacks on IT systems and networks. Honeypots can also be used to analyze the ways
attackers try to compromise an information system and to provide valuable insights into potential
system loopholes. This research investigated the effectiveness of the existing methodologies that
used honeynet to detect and prevent attacks. The study used centralized system management
technologies called Puppet and Virtual Machines to implement automated honeypot solutions. A
centralized logging system was used to collect information about the source IP address, country,
and timestamp of attackers. The unique contributions of this thesis include: The research results
show how open source technologies is used to dynamically add or modify hacking incidences in
a high-interaction honeynet system; the thesis outlines strategies for making honeypots more
attractive for hackers to spend more time to provide hacking evidence.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Introduction
In recent times, there has been a growing interest in security and information protection
for network systems. Network systems contain valuable data and resources that must be
protected from attackers. Security experts often use honeypots and honeynets to protect network
systems. Honeypot is an outstanding technology that security experts use to tap new hacking
techniques from attackers and intruders.
According to Spitzner (2002), founder of the Honeynet Project, “a honeypot is security
resource whose value lies in being probed, attacked, or compromised” (p. 58). It can also be
defined as “an information system resource whose value lies in unauthorized or illicit use of that
resource” (Spitzner, 2003). In other words, a honeypot is a decoy, put out on a network as bait to
lure attackers. Honeypots are typically virtual machines, designed to emulate real machines, act
or create the appearance of running full services and applications, with open ports that might be
found on a typical system or server on a network (Sahu & Richhariya, 2012).
In this research, a centralized system management called Puppet was used to automate
the configuration of four servers. A VMware Virtual Machine was used to implement automated
honeypot solutions. The study provided targets with interesting services such as Apache
webserver, MYSQL server, File Transfer Protocol (FTP) server and Simple Mail Transfer
Protocol (SMTP) server. A centralized Logstash server was used to process and index logs.
Elasticsearch was used to store logs. Kibana was used to search and visualize the logs.
Problem Statement
Attempts by attackers to breach security systems are rising every day. Intruders use tools
like SubSeven, Nmap and LoftCrack to scan, identify, probe and penetrate Enterprise systems.

11
Firewalls are put in place to prevent such unauthorized access to the Enterprise Networks.
However, Firewalls cannot prevent attacks coming from Intranet.
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) reviews network traffic and identify exploits and
vulnerabilities; it is able to display alert, log event, and e-mail administrators of possible attacks.
An Intrusion Prevention System on the other hand makes attempts to prevent known intrusion
signatures and some unknown attacks due to the knowledge of attack behaviors in its database.
However, an IDS can generate thousands of intrusion alerts every day, some of which are false
positives. This makes it difficult for an IDS to detect and identify the actual threats and to
protect assets. Thus, human intervention is required to investigate the attacks detected and
reported by an IDS (Kaur, Malhotra, & Singh, 2014).
Nature and Significance of the Problem
Honeypots can dramatically reduce false positives. Honeypots are designed to track
illegal activities. This makes it extremely efficient to use honeypots for detecting attacks.
Honeypots only collect data from human or processes interactions. Organizations that may log
thousands of alerts a day with traditional technologies will only log a hundred alerts with
honeypots (Kaur et al., 2014). Honeypots, on the other hand, can easily be used to identify and
capture new attacks. New attacks can easily be detected by a honeypot because any illegal
activity is an anomaly. Thus honeypots can be used to collect, manage and analyze more attack
data.
Objective of the Study
The objectives of this experiment are: (1) to use free and open-source technologies and
methods to reduce the amount of manual intervention needed to add to or modify a high-
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interaction honeypot system suitable for academic research, and (2) to detect attack patterns on
services and come out with solution to mitigate the attacks.
Research Questions
1. How should open source technologies be used to dynamically add or modify hacking
incidences in a high-interaction honeynet system?
2. How should honeypots be made more attractive for hackers to spend more time to
provide hacking evidences?
Definition of Terms
Honeypot: Honey Pot Systems are decoy servers or systems setup to gather information
about attackers who intrude into a system.
Puppet: a unique approach to IT automation for discovering, configuring, and managing
network infrastructure
Virtual Machines: a virtual machine is a type of computer application used to create a
virtual environment, which is referred to as "virtualization." Some types of virtualization let a
user run multiple operating systems on one computer at the same time.
HonSSH: a great tool for high-level honeypot interaction
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Chapter 2: Background and Review of Literature
Introduction
This chapter discusses the background literature associated with the issues of the design
and implementation of effective honeypots and honeynets.
Background Related to the Problem
During the last few years, many different uses of honeypots have been proposed. Some
of them are deployed to waste hackers’ time (Liston, 2002), others to reduce spam activity
(Krawetz, 2004) or to deceive attackers (Virvilis, Serrano, & Vanautgaerden, 2014), and some to
analyze hacker intrusion steps (Akkaya & Thalgott, 2010). For several years, the security
community has used honeypots to analyze different techniques deployed by attackers.
Spitzner (2003) introduced two types of honeypots: low-level interaction honeypots are
computer software that emulate operating systems and services–usually applied in a production
environment within an organization, and high-level interaction honeypots that involve the
deployment of actual operating systems on real or virtual machines–it is also used by security
research. Also, Spitzner (2003) defined two critical requirements of honeynet architecture: (1)
the data control reduced risk by ensuring that once an attacker breaks into honeynet systems,
those compromised systems cannot be used to attack or harm other systems, and (2) data capture
ensures that security experts can detect and capture all activities performed by the attacker, even
if they are encrypted. This study used high interaction honeypots to capture data from real-life
systems.
Sobesto et al. (2011) introduced DarkNOC, a management and monitoring tool for
complex honeynets. It consists of different types of honeypots as well as other data collection
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devices. They designed a solution that is able to process large amount of malicious traffic
received by a large honeynet and effectively provide a user-friendly web interface to show
potential compromised hosts to network security administrators, and also provide the overall
network security status. This research used Kibana to implement, a user-friendly web interface,
to visually show the attacks eith high incidence. Dittrich (2004) noted that a distributed
honeynet can grow in size. A single honeypot cannot effectively monitor and manage attacks.
The data analysis of attacks originating from a large number of individual honeypots within a
network is difficult. Dittrich recommended the use of Manuka, a database tool with front and
back end client applications for resolving this difficult problem. The database includes attributes
of systems augment a search for operating system type, version and services installed. He stated
that the Manuka tool can only take one person to install honeypots, upload it to a database and
rapidly deploy it in a distributed network. Likewise, this study used an open source Puppet
automation management tool to deploy servers and services on honeypots without manual
intervention.
Weiler (2002) proposed a system that can be applied by large organizations to defend
against distributed denial of service attacks. His study relied on honeypot technology that has
two advantages. First, the system can defend the operational network of the organization against
known distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS) and against new future types of attacks.
Second, the system can trap the attacker and record the compromised components to provide
evidence for use in a legal action. Weiler said the lessons learned can be implemented in the rest
of the network as a protective shield.
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Weiler (2002) designed includes a demilitarized zone network that implemented services
such as web, mail, ftp and DNS for access by external networks. The local internal network
(LAN) of the organization is in another zone protected by a firewall. The infrastructure, then
introduced a new system: a honeypot that will mimic the internal network and attract DDoS
attackers. Furthermore, Weiler made internal systems in the organization to act as a honeypot.
“For example, if the attacker’s compromised packets to the webserver of the corporation are
detected, the packets go to the honeypot for processing. The reply the attacker gets can be
indistinguishable from a real reply of the web server” (Weiler, 2002, p. 5).
The above design solved three problems, these are: attacks can be detectable, attack
packets can be actively directed to the honeypot, and the honeypot is able to simulate the
organization’s network infrastructure, at least the parts known to the attacker.
Wilson, Maimon, Sobesto, and Cukier (2015) studied the effect of a surveillance banner
in the attacked computer system that reduced the probability of commands being typed in the
system during longer first system trespassing incidents. The study further stated the probability
of commands being typed during subsequent system trespassing incidents, on the same system, is
conditioned by the presence of a surveillance banner and by whether commands have been
entered by previous trespassing incidents.
Wilson et al.’s (2015) results show that the average number of system trespassing
incidents per computer are 4.44 and 4.48 for no surveillance banner and surveillance banner
computers, respectively. This is not a statistically significant difference; however, the presence
of a banner did affect the seriousness of trespassing incidents. The study further stated that
intruders receiving a surveillance banner, that spent at least 50 seconds on the system, are 8%
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less likely to enter commands into the system than respective intruders that do not receive a
surveillance banner. Of those that did not previously enter commands into the system, 38% of
those with the surveillance banner and 47% of those with no surveillance banner entered
commands during the second trespassing incident. Moreover, of those that do enter commands
into the system, 67% of those with the surveillance banner and 63% of those with no surveillance
banner entered commands during the second trespassing incident.
The study originates from a randomized controlled trial conducted at a large public
university in the United States. Over a 7-month experimental period, 660 target computer
systems were deployed after being compromised by system trespassers. These systems produced
2,942 system trespassing incidents (Wilson et al., 2015). Again, they said, each of these systems
was randomly assigned to either display a surveillance banner (n=324) or not display a
surveillance banner (n=336) upon each entry to the relevant system. The surveillance banner is
depicted at left exactly as the intruders saw it, with the message: “This system is under
continuous surveillance. All user activity is being monitored and recorded” (Wilson et al., 2015,
p. 11)
Literature Related to the Problem
Stockman, Rein, & Heile (2015) used open-source honeynet system to study system
banner message effects on hackers. The study was performed for 25 days, gathering data on
almost 200,000 events.
According to Stockman et al. (2015), there were 510 logins allowed via the password
spoofing, and of the 510 logins, 280 were served a warning banner, and 230 were served no
banner at all. The mean duration of attempts for those with the warning banner was 15.29
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seconds, and for those without, 23.45 seconds. The median duration of those with the warning
banner was 9 seconds, and of those without, 11 seconds. In addition, intruders did nothing while
logged in due to the fact that the system recorded only a handful of commands. However, they
stated that, the study did not allowed attackers to log in as root, and that might cause lower levels
of activity.
Stockman et al.’s (2015) works used the manual intervention in setting up the honeynet.
However, this study explored ways to provide targets of greater interest for hackers to attack
services such as web or database servers which appear to be resources of actual value for
attackers.
Döring (2005) proposed five test cases within which honeypot can be deployed
differently in separate environment and explains their individual attributes. According his study,
“the amount of attacks occurring in a protected environment are less than the number of attacks
coming from the unprotected environment at least they should. Therefore, a comparison of
results afterwards needs to focus on the environment.”
The results of Döring’s (2005) research provided a pratical approach for honeypot
deployment. He discussed four phases: analysis, development, realization and conclusion phase.
According to him, the first phase of development start by gathering knowledge about Honeypots
and defining requirements. The development phase concentrates on selecting a particular
solution and preparing the requirements for an experiment. The next phase deals with the
practical research and empirical analysis and the final phase the gathered results and conclusions
are summarized.
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Hoque and Bikas (2012) presented an Intrusion Detection System (IDS), using genetic
algorithm (GA) to efficiently detect various types of network attacks. Their approached used
evolution theory to information evolution in order to filter the traffic data and thus reduce
complexity. They used randomly generated population of chromosomes, which represent all
possible solution of a problem that are considered candidate solutions. From each chromosome
different positions are encoded as bits, characters or numbers.
Similarly, Jaiganesh, Sumathi, and Vinitha (2013) compared two data mining
classification algorithms for intrusion detection system, Iterative Dichotomiser2 (ID3) algorithm
and C4.5 algorithm. The results presented by Jaiganesh et al. (2013) shows C4.5 algorithm was
best suited for intrusion detection, because it uses numeric and nominal data.
In addition, Stiawan, Abdullah, and Idris (2011) presented mapping problem and
challenges of Intrusion Prevention System (IPS). They summarized current methods in
implementing IPS, the future directions and challenges in reseach field. Stiawan et al. stated in
their results that, “Hybrid techniques is one of solution for classification and detection intrusion
threat.” The hybrid IPS is able to data capture accuracy and precision for threats.

19
Chapter 3: Methodology
Introduction
This chapter discusses the details of the network design used to investigate attacks on our
honeypots and to detect and prevent this events in real time. The approach used for this network
was a mixed one, using both literature studied and laboratory experiments.
Design of the Study

Honeypot 1

Logstah,
Elasticse
arch and
kibana

Honeypot 2

Linux Server
Router

Honeypot 3

Firewall

Honeypot 4
Puppet
Management
Server

Figure 1: Network Design Diagram
Figure 1 shows the system configuration used to examine, detects, and prevent attacks on
our honeypots. It consists of a firewall, router, Bifrozt Linux Server, HonSSH, Filebeat
Elasticsearch, Logstash, Kibana, Puppet and four virtual machine honeypots. The system setup
is explained below.
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Tools and Techniques
Puppet is an open-source configuration management utility. It runs on many Unixlike systems as well as on Microsoft Windows. It is an automation software for IT system
administrators. It is used to automate repetitive tasks such as the installation of applications and
services, patch management, and deployments. Puppet was selected because it was used to
install servers and automate services in this design.
Elasticsearch was used because it is able to achieve fast search responses instead of
searching the text directly, it searches an index instead. Elasticsearch is designed to be scalable
and distributed.
Kibana is an open source (Apache Licensed) browser based analytics and search
dashboard for Elasticsearch that visualized the data to provide a better interpretation. It was used
to visualize captured logs from compromised honeypots.
HonSSH was used because it is the only currently available up-to-date open-source highinteraction honeypot software. Alternatives examined included Honeyd and Honeywall.
However, all these other open-source honeypots are either restricted to low- or mediuminteraction, or are badly out of date and difficult or impossible to install on modern Linux
distributions (Stockman et al., 2015).
Hardware and Software Environment
The honeynet system consist of Linux virtual machines running on VMware Workstation,
version 12, hosted on Intel Core i7-4765T CPU, with 12 Gigabytes of RAM and 500 Gigabytes
of storage. The virtual machine based honeynet has of 4 honeypot systems, a centralized logging
host and Puppet automation host. Each honeypot system is consisted with three individual hosts;
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a router, a firewall, and a Linux server host. The Linux server provided a Secure Shell (SSH)
service to act as the target for attackers.
Data Collection
Data were collected using Logstash, an open source data collection engine with real-time
pipelining capabilities. Logstash can dynamically unify data from disparate sources and
normalize the data into destinations. It cleanses and democratizes data for diverse advanced
downstream analytics and visualization use. This was chosen because of its centralized log
management which was used to collect all logs from compromised honeypots.
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Chapter 4: Implementation, Data Analysis, and Results
Introduction
This chapter presents a detailed description of honeypot implementation. The detailed
installation and configuration steps of the honepots are provided. The chapter outlines the
resources required for data analysis and generating reports.
Puppet Configurations
Puppet configure and automate user management on all puppet agents (honeypots). First,
the hostname of puppet master was set as pupperserver.com in the hostname configuration file.
In addition, the /etc/hosts configuration file of puppet master was edited. Each node was set to
point to the proper IP address as shown below.
192.168.1.10 puppetserver.com
192.168.1.12 node1
192.168.1.6

node2

192.168.1.8

node3

192.168.1.13 node4
Installing Puppet Enterprise
1. Download puppet-enterprise-2015.3.2-sles-12-x86_64.tar.gz
2. Tar –xf puppet-enterprise-2015.3.2-sles-12-x86_64.tar.gz
3. Run sudo ./puppet-enterprise-installer
4. On the browser https://puppetserver.com:3000
5. Add security exceptions
6. Click get started
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7. Select Monolithic for deployment type
8. Enter puppet master FQDN: puppetserver.com
9. Select Install PostgreSQL
10. Enter password
11. Submit
12. Click deploy now
Installing Puppet Enterprise Agent
The agents (honeypots) were installed with the same operating system and architecture as
the Puppet master. The process started by logging into all the agent nodes and run the following
command: curl -k https://puppetserver.com:8140/packages/2015.3.2/install.bash | sudo bash.
This script detected the operating system on which the agent is running, sets up an apt that refers
back to the Puppet master, and pulls down and installs the puppet-agent packages. After the
installation is completed, certificate request is sent to the puppet master for approval. On the
master console the agents are accepted as follows:
1. Click on nodes
2. Select unsigned certificates
3. Click Accept All
Each honeypot (node) was configured with Network Time Protocol (NTP) to synchronize
the clocks to Chicago time reference by running # puppet module install puppetlabs-ntp on the
puppet master and puppet agent–t on all the agents (honeypots). Secure Shell (SSH) module was
installed by running puppet module install ghoneycutt-ssh to allow remote access to any of the
honeypots.
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Figure 2: Overview Configuration of the Honeypots
Figure 2 shows the overview of management console that was used to automate four honeypots
which includes Puppet master, honeypot 1, honeypot 2, honeypot 3, and honeypot 4.
Honeypot 1 Configuration
Apache module was configured to manage webserver to attract attackers using puppet
module install puppetlabs-apache. See appendix for configuration file.
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Figure 3: The Configuration of Honeypot 1
Figure 3 shows the automation of Apache webserver, NTP server and SSH server on honeypot 1.
Honeypot 2 Configuration
MYSQL server was installed using the following module from puppetlab forge puppet
module install puppetlabs-mysql. See appendix for configuration file.
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Figure 4: The Configuration of Honeypot 2
Figure 4 shows the automation of MYSQL server, NTP server and SSH server on honeypot 2.
Honeypot 3 Configuration
The File Transfer Protocol (FTP) server was configured by using this setup puppet
module install thias-vsftpd. See appendix for file configuration.
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Figure 5: The Configuration of Honeypot 3
Figure 5 shows the automation of FTP server, NTP server and SSH server on honeypot 3.
Honeypot 4 Configuration
The Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) server was configured using puppet module
install thias-vsftpd module. See appendix for file configuration.
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Figure 6: The Configuration of Honeypot 4
Figure 6 shows the automation of SMTP server, NTP server and SSH server on honeypot 4.
HonSSH Configurations
HonSSH is a high-interaction Honeypot solution, when configured as static it sits
between an attacker and a honeypot, creating two separate SSH connections between them, and
when configured using script it sits between attacker and multiple honeypots, creating one too
many SSH connections between them. In this study, HonSSH was configured to sit between the
attacker and the four honeypots configured using Puppet automation management tool. HonSSH
server was configured on the Bifrozt Linux machine.
1. Install dependencies sudo apt-get install python-dev openssl python-openssl python-pyasn1
python-twisted python-2.7 python-mysqldb python-geoip
2. git clone https://github.com/tnich/honssh.git.
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3. See appendix for honssh configuration file
4. ./honsshctrl.sh start

Figure 7: Random Selection of Honeypot
Figure 7 shows a python script to randomly select any of the honeypots for the attacker to
connect to any of the four honeypots.
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Figure 8: Banner Message
Figure 8, shows banner message that an attacker sees when they login. Puppet was configured to
allow a banner message that serves as deterrent to attackers and any bypass of this message to
the honeypots is considered as an attack.
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Elasticsearch, Logstash, and Kibana
Configuration

Figure 9: ELK Stack Server and Bifrozt Server
Figure 9 shows detailed configuration between ELK/Logstash server and the Bifrozt server.
Elasticsearch 2.2, Logstash 2.2, and Kibana 4.4 was installed on Ubuntu 14.04 Server
(ELK/Logstash Server) to gather and visualize the logs of honeypots in a centralized location by
using Filebeat 1.1 to ship the logs. Logstash is an open source tool for collecting, parsing, and
storing logs for future use. Kibana is a web interface that can be used to search and view the
logs that Logstash has indexed. Both of these tools are based on Elasticsearch which is used for
storing logs (Anicas, 2015).
Install Java 8
1. sudo add-apt-repository -y ppa:webupd8team/java
2. sudo apt-get update
3. sudo apt-get -y install oracle-java8-installer

Install Elasticsearch
1. wget -qO - https://packages.elastic.co/GPG-KEY-elasticsearch | sudo apt-key add –
2. echo "deb http://packages.elastic.co/elasticsearch/2.x/debian stable main" | sudo tee -a
/etc/apt/sources.list.d/elasticsearch-2.x.list
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3. sudo apt-get update
4. sudo apt-get -y install elasticsearch
5. sudo vi /etc/elasticsearch/elasticsearch.yml
6. network.host: localhost
7. sudo service elasticsearch restart
8. sudo update-rc.d elasticsearch defaults 95 10

Install Kibana
1. echo "deb http://packages.elastic.co/kibana/4.4/debian stable main" | sudo tee -a
/etc/apt/sources.list.d/kibana-4.4.x.list
2. sudo apt-get update
3. sudo apt-get -y install kibana
4. sudo vi /opt/kibana/config/kibana.yml
5. server.host: "localhost"
6. sudo update-rc.d kibana defaults 96 9
7. sudo service kibana start

Install Nginx
Because we configured Kibana to listen on localhost, we must set up a reverse proxy to
allow external access to it. We used Nginx for this purpose.
1. sudo apt-get install nginx apache2-utils
2. sudo htpasswd -c /etc/nginx/htpasswd.users kibanaadmin
3. sudo vi /etc/nginx/sites-available/default
4. See nginx config file
5. sudo service nginx restart
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Install Logstash
The Logstash package was installed from the same repository as Elasticsearch as follows:
1. echo 'deb http://packages.elastic.co/logstash/2.2/debian stable main' | sudo tee
/etc/apt/sources.list.d/logstash-2.2.x.list
2. sudo apt-get update
3. sudo apt-get install logstash

Generate SSL Certificates
Filebeat was used to ship logs from the HonSSH server and a SSL certificate and key pair
was created. The certificate was used by Filebeat to verify the identity of ELK server. Two
directories were created to store the certificate and private key with the following commands:
1. sudo mkdir -p /etc/pki/tls/certs
2. sudo mkdir /etc/pki/tls/private

The ELK Server's private IP address was added to the subjectAltName field of the SSL
certificate that was generated:
sudo vi /etc/ssl/openssl.cnf
subjectAltName = IP: 192.168.1.14
1. cd /etc/pki/tls
2. sudo openssl req -config /etc/ssl/openssl.cnf -x509 -days 3650 -batch -nodes -newkey
rsa:2048 -keyout private/logstash-forwarder.key -out certs/logstash-forwarder.crt

Copy SSL Certificate
The SSL certificate was copied from ELK Server to Bifrozt Server:
1. scp –P 58595 /etc/pki/tls/certs/logstash-forwarder.crt cna@192.168.1.5:/tmp
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On the Bifrozt Server:
1. sudo mkdir -p /etc/pki/tls/certs
2. sudo cp /tmp/logstash-forwarder.crt /etc/pki/tls/certs/

Install Filebeat Package
On the Bifrozt Linux Server, Filebeat was installed as below:
1. echo "deb https://packages.elastic.co/beats/apt stable main" | sudo tee -a
/etc/apt/sources.list.d/beats.list
2. wget -qO - https://packages.elastic.co/GPG-KEY-elasticsearch | sudo apt-key add 3. sudo apt-get update
4. sudo apt-get install filebeat
5. sudo service filebeat restart
6. sudo update-rc.d filebeat defaults 95 10

After installation, Filebeat transported logs from the HonSSH server to the Logstash server.
Filebeat serves as a log shipping agent that utilizes the lumberjack networking protocol to
communicate with Logstash.
Filebeat Configuration
filebeat:
prospectors:
paths:
- /opt/honssh/logs/*.log
document_type: log
registry_file: /var/lib/filebeat/registry
output:
logstash:
hosts: ["192.168.1.14:5044"]
bulk_max_size: 1024
tls:
certificate_authorities: ["/etc/pki/tls/certs/logstash-forwarder.crt"]
shipper:
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logging:
files:

Logstash Server Configuration
input {
beats {
port => 5044
ssl => true
ssl_certificate => "/etc/pki/tls/certs/logstash-forwarder.crt"
ssl_key => "/etc/pki/tls/private/logstash-forwarder.key"
}
}
filter {
grok {
match => { "message" => "%{TIMESTAMP_ISO8601:timestamp} \[%{WORD:text},$
}
mutate {
gsub => ["rest", "'", '"']
gsub => ["rest", "False", "false"]
}
json {
source => "rest"
}
mutate {
remove_field => ["rest", "message"]
}
}
output {
elasticsearch {
host => ["localhost:9200"]
protocol => http
manage_template => false
index => "%{[@metadata][beat]}-%{+YYYY.MM.dd}"
document_type => "%{[@metadata][type]}"
}
stdout { codec => rubydebug }
}
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Data Analysis and Results
The experimental investigation on the honeypots was performed for 10 days. Figure 10
shows the total hits on the honeypots. During this period, almost 500,000 attacks were captured.
The experiment mirrors real world implementation of honeynet system because a Webserver,
File Transfer Protocol, and Simple Mail Tranfer Protocol and MYSQL servers were installed on
the honeypots. The attack data was analyzed by calculating the frequencies, percentages, Chi
square and the P-value for each of the honeypots. The data analysis investigated the top source
IP addresses, top five attacks, top five countries, daily attacks, top ten passwords, top ten
usernames and top ten source ports.

Figure 10: Total Event of Honeypots
Table 1: Top 5 Source IP
ATTACKS ON HONEYPOT 1

TOTAL

Top Source IP

Frequency

Percentage %

218.25.208.124
222.186.21.211
121.12.127.94
59.49.5.235
119.146.221.68

831
368
274
143
30

50.49%
22.36%
16.65%
8.69%
1.82%

1646

100.00%
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X2 = 1155.974484
P –Value = < 0.0001
Table 1 shows the frequencies and percentages of the attacks on honeypot 1 from the top five
source IP addresses. The Chi square value of 1155 for investigating the equality of the
proportions of that attacks from these IP addresses is significant at the 0.0001 level. There tends
to be a high incidence of attacks from IP address 218.25.208.124.
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Figure 11: The Graph of Top 5 Source IP
Figure 11 shows the graph of the attacks on honeypot 1 from the top five source IP addresses.
Clearly, the IP address 218.25.208.124 produced the most attacks (50.49%) and the IP address
119.146.221.68 generated the least attacks (1.82%). Consequently, the IP address
218.25.208.124 had the high incidence of attacks on honeypot 1.
Table 2: Top 5 Countries Attacks
Countries

Frequency

China
United States
Viet Nam
Bulgaria
Ukraine

1745
65
58
27
26

TOTAL

1921

X2 = 6028.034357
P –Value = < 0.0001

Percentage %
90.84%
3.38%
3.02%
1.41%
1.35%
100.0%
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Table 2 shows the frequencies and percentages of the attacks on honeypot 1 from the top five
countries. The Chi square value of 6028 for investigating the equality of the proportions of that
attacks from these countries is significant at the 0.0001 level. There tends to be a high incidence
of attacks from China.
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Figure 12: The Graph of Top 5 Countries
Figure 12 shows the graph of the attacks on honeypot 1 from the top five countries. Clearly,
China produced the most attacks (90.84%) and Ukraine generated the least attacks (1.35%).
Consequently, China had the high incidence of attacks on honeypot 1.
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Table 3: Daily Attacks
Timestamp

Frequency

Percentage %

4
118
30
5
99
88
480
25
182
925

.20%
6.03%
1.53%
0.26%
5.06%
4.50%
24.54%
1.28%
9.30%
47.29%

4/4/2016
4/5/2016
4/6/2016
4/7/2016
4/8/2016
4/9/2016
4/10/2016
4/11/2016
4/12/2016
4/13/2016
TOTAL

1956

100.0%

X2 = 1438.203476
P –Value = < 0.0001
Table 3 shows the frequencies and percentages of top ten daily attacks on honeypot 1. The Chi
square value of 1438 for investigating the equality of the proportions of that attacks on these
timestamp is significant at the 0.0001 level. There tends to be a high incidence of attacks on
4/13/2016.
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Figure 13: The Graph of Daily Attacks
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Figure 13 shows the graph of the attacks on honeypot 1 base on the top ten timestamps. Clearly,
4/13/2016 produced the most attacks (47.29%) and 4/4/2016 generated the least attacks (0.20%).
Consequently, 4/13/2016 had the high incidence of attacks on honeypot 1.
Table 4: Top 5 Source IP Attacks
ATTACKS ON HONEYPOT 2
Top Source IP

Frequency

Percentage %

218.25.208.124
222.186.21.211
121.12.127.94
59.47.5.235
119.146.221.68

859
391
273
100
38

51.72%
23.54%
16.44%
6.02%
2.29%

TOTAL

1661

100.0%

X2 = 1279.201686
P –Value = < 0.0001
Table 4 shows the frequencies and percentages of the attacks on honeypot 2 from the top five
source IP addresses. The Chi square value of 1279 for investigating the equality of the
proportions of that attacks from these IP addresses is significant at the 0.0001 level. There tends
to be a high incidence of attacks from IP address 218.25.208.124.
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Figure 14: The Graph of Top 5 Source IP
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Figure 14 shows the graph of the attacks on honeypot 2 from the top five source IP addresses.
Clearly, the IP address 218.25.208.124 produced the most attacks (51.72%) and the IP address
119.146.221.68 generated the least attacks (2.29%). Consequently, the IP address
218.25.208.124 had the high incidence of attacks on honeypot 2.
Table 5: Top 5 Countries Attacks
Countries

Frequency

China
United States
Viet Nam
Bulgaria
Ukraine

1749
61
60
38
18

TOTAL

1926

Percentage %
90.81%
3.17%
3.12%
1.97%
0.93%
100.0%

X2 = 6038.92731
P –Value = < 0.0001
Table 5 shows the frequencies and percentages of the attacks on honeypot 2 from the top five
countries. The Chi square value of 6038 for investigating the equality of the proportions of that
attacks from these countries is significant at the 0.0001 level. There tends to be a high incidence
of attacks from China.
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Figure 15: The Graph of Top 5 Countries Attacks
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Figure 15 shows the graph of the attacks on honeypot 1 from the top five countries. Clearly,
China produced the most attacks (90.81%) and Ukraine generated the least attacks (0.93%).
Consequently, China had the high incidence of attacks on honeypot 2.
Table 6: Attacks Per Day
Timestamp
4/4/2016
4/5/2016
4/6/2016
4/7/2016
4/8/2016
4/9/2016
4/10/2016
4/11/2016
4/12/2016
4/13/2016
TOTAL

Frequency

Percentage %

2
105
15
5
107
96
493
22
177
938

.10%
5.36%
0.77%
0.26%
5.46%
4.90%
25.15%
1.12%
9.03%
47.86%

1956

100.0%

X2 = 1477.188776
P –Value = < 0.0001
Table 6 shows the frequencies and percentages of top ten daily attacks on honeypot 1. The Chi
square value of 1477 for investigating the equality of the proportions of that attacks on these
timestamps is significant at the 0.0001 level. There tends to be a high incidence of attacks on
4/13/2016.
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TOP 10 ATTACKS BY DAY
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Figure 16: The Graph of Daily Attacks
Figure 16 shows the graph of the attacks on honeypot 2 base on the top ten timestamps. Clearly,
4/13/2016 produced the most attacks (47.86%) and 4/4/2016 generated the least attacks (0.10%).
Consequently, 4/13/2016 had the high incidence of attacks on honeypot 2.
Table 7: Top 5 Source IP Attacks
ATTACKS ON HONEYPOT 3
Top Source IP

Frequency

Percentage %

218.25.208.124
222.186.21.211
121.12.127.94
59.47.5.235
119.146.221.68

843
378
314
127
33

49.73%
22.30%
18.53%
7.49%
1.95 %

TOTAL

X2 = 1164.430678
P –Value = < 0.0001

1695

100.0%
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Table 7 shows the frequencies and percentages of the attacks on honeypot 3 from the top five
source IP addresses. The Chi square value of 1164 for investigating the equality of the
proportions of that attacks from these IP addresses is significant at the 0.0001 level. There tends
to be a high incidence of attacks from IP address 218.25.208.124.
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Figure 17: The Graph of Top Source IP Attacks
Figure 17 shows the graph of the attacks on honeypot 3 from the top five source IP addresses.
Clearly, the IP address 218.25.208.124 produced the most attacks (49.73%) and the IP address
194.141.252.30 generated the least attacks (1.95%). Consequently, the IP address
218.25.208.124 had the high incidence of attacks on honeypot 3.
Table 8: Top 5 Countries Attacks
Countries

Frequency

China
United States
Viet Nam
Bulgaria
Ukraine

1789
79
65
33
24

TOTAL

1990

X2 = 6081.98995
P –Value = < 0.0001

Percentage %
89.90%
3.97%
3.27%
1.66%
1.21%
100.0%
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Table 8 shows the frequencies and percentages of the attacks on honeypot 2 from the top five
countries. The Chi square value of 6081 for investigating the equality of the proportions of that
attacks from these countries is significant at the 0.0001 level. There tends to be a high incidence
of attacks from China
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Figure 18: The Graph of Top 5 Countries Attacks
Figure 18 shows the graph of the attacks on honeypot 3 from the top five countries. Clearly,
China produced the most attacks (89.90%) and Hong Kong generated the least attacks (1.21%).
Consequently, China had the high incidence of attacks on honeypot 3.
Table 9: Attacks Per Day
Timestamp
4/4/2016
4/5/2016
4/6/2016
4/7/2016
4/8/2016
4/9/2016
4/10/2016
4/11/2016
4/12/2016
4/13/2016
TOTAL

X2 = 1524.878935
P –Value = < 0.0001

Frequency

Percentage %

2
114
40
7
100
93
494
30
199
986

0.10%
5.52%
1.94%
0.34%
4.84%
4.50%
23.92%
1.45%
9.64%
47.75%

2065

100.0%
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Table 9 shows the frequencies and percentages of top ten daily attacks on honeypot 1. The Chi
square value of 1524 for investigating the equality of the proportions of that attacks on these
timestamps is significant at the 0.0001 level. There tends to be a high incidence of attacks on
4/13/2016.
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Figure 19: The Graph of Daily Attacks
Figure 19 shows the graph of the attacks on honeypot 3 base on the top ten timestamps. Clearly,
4/13/2016 produced the most attacks (47.75%) and 4/4/2016 generated the least attacks (0.10%).
Consequently, 4/13/2016 had the high incidence of attacks on honeypot 3.
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Table 10: Top 5 Source IP Attacks
ATTACKS ON HONEYPOT 4
Top Source IP

Frequency

Percentage %

218.25.208.124
222.186.21.211
121.12.127.94
59.47.5.235
119.146.221.68

848
322
316
100
34

52.35%
19.88%
19.51%
6.17%
2.10 %

TOTAL

1620

100.0%

X2 = 1262.098765
P –Value = < 0.0001
Table 10 shows the frequencies and percentages of the attacks on honeypot 4 from the top five
source IP addresses. The Chi square value of 1262 for investigating the equality of the
proportions of that attacks from these IP addresses is significant at the 0.0001 level. There tends
to be a high incidence of attacks from IP address 218.25.208.124.
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Figure 20: The Graph of Top 5 Source IP
Figure 20 shows the graph of the attacks on honeypot 4 from the top five source IP addresses.
Clearly, the IP address 218.25.208.124 produced the most attacks (52.35%) and the IP address

48
194.141.252.30 generated the least attacks (2.10%). Consequently, the IP address
218.25.208.124 had the high incidence of attacks on honeypot 4.
Table 11: Top 5 Countries Attacks
Countries

Frequency

China
United States
Viet Nam
Bulgaria
Ukraine

1711
85
51
33
23

TOTAL

1904

Percentage %
89.86%
4.46%
2.68%
1.79%
1.21%
100.0%

X2 = 5814.046218
P –Value = < 0.0001
Table 11 shows the frequencies and percentages of the attacks on honeypot 4 from the top five
countries. The Chi square value of 5814 for investigating the equality of the proportions of that
attacks from these countries is significant at the 0.0001 level. There tends to be a high incidence
of attacks from China.
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Figure 21: The Graph of Top 5 Countries Attacks
Figure 21 shows the graph of the attacks on honeypot 4 from the top five countries. Clearly,
China produced the most attacks (89.86%) and Ukraine generated the least attacks (1.21%).
Consequently, China had the high incidence of attacks on honeypot 4.
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Table 12: Attacks Per Day
Timestamp
4/4/2016
4/5/2016
4/6/2016
4/7/2016
4/8/2016
4/9/2016
4/10/2016
4/11/2016
4/12/2016
4/13/2016
TOTAL

Frequency

Percentage %

4
96
26
9
98
75
487
19
209
926

0.21%
4.93%
1.33%
0.46%
5.03%
3.85%
24.99%
0.97%
10.72%
47.51%

1949

100.0%

X2 = 1452.638789
P –Value = < 0.0001
Table 12 shows the frequencies and percentages of top ten daily attacks on honeypot 4. The Chi
square value of 1452 for investigating the equality of the proportions of that attacks on these
timestamps is significant at the 0.0001 level. There tends to be a high incidence of attacks on
4/13/2016.
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Figure 22: The Graph of Daily Attacks
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Figure 22 shows the graph of the attacks on honeypot 4 base on the top ten timestamps. Clearly,
4/13/2016 produced the most attacks (47.51%) and 4/4/2016 generated the least attacks (0.21%).
Consequently, 4/13/2016 had the high incidence of attacks on honeypot 4.
Table 13: Top 10 Password
Password

Frequency

Percentage %

admin
support
123456
password
1234
root
user
ubnt
default
test

80
73
65
53
51
43
40
38
32
28

15.90%
14.51%
12.92%
10.54%
10.14%
8.55%
7.95%
7.55%
6.36%
5.57%

TOTAL

503

100.0%

X2 = 54.95228628
P –Value = < 0.0001
Table 13 shows the frequencies and percentages of the attacks on four honeypots from the top
ten passwords. The Chi square value of 54 for investigating the equality of the proportions of
passwords used in the attacks is significant at the 0.0001 level. There tends to be a high
incidence of attacks using root.
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TOP 10 PASSWORD
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Figure 23: The Graph of Top Password Combined
Figure 23 shows the graph of the attacks on the honeypots from the top ten password. Clearly,
admin was used the most (15.90%) and test was used the least (5.57%). Consequently, admin
had the high incidence of attacks on honeypots.
Table 14: The Top 10 Username Combined
Username
root
admin
support
user
ubnt
test
1234
guest
ubuntu
oracle
TOTAL

X2 = 20745.7434
P –Value = < 0.0001

Frequency
2867
340
56
48
46
30
22
15
13
12
3449

Percentage %
83.13%
9.86%
1.62%
1.39%
1.33%
0.87%
0.64%
0.43%
0.38%
0.35%
100.0%
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Table 14 shows the frequencies and percentages of the attacks on four honeypots from the top
ten usernanes. The Chi square value of 20745 for investigating the equality of the proportions of
usernanes used in the attacks is significant at the 0.0001 level. There tends to be a high incidence
of attacks using root.
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Figure 24: The Graph of Top 10 Username Combined
Figure 24 shows the graph of the attacks on the honeypots from the top ten usernames. Clearly,
root was used the most (83.13%) and oracle was used the least (0.35%). Consequently, root had
the high incidence of attacks on honeypots.
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Table 15: Top 10 Source Port

ALL
Source Port
20974
1779
1782
1780
1781
1688
1783
1516
2100
1450
TOTAL

Frequency
23
13
10
9
8
7
7
6
6
5

Percentage%
24.47%
13.83%
10.64%
9.57%
8.51%
7.45%
7.45%
6.38%
6.38%
5.32%

94

100.0%

X2 = 27.06382979
P –Value = < 0.0014
Table 14 shows the top 10 source port used by attackers on all the honeypots, with corresponding
frequencies, percentages. Table 14 shows the frequencies and percentages of the attacks on four
honeypots from the top 10 sources port. The Chi square value of 27 for investigating the
equality of the proportions of sources port used in the attacks is significant at the 0.0014 level.
There tends to be a high incidence of attacks using port 20974.
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TOP 10 SOURCE PORT
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Figure 25: The Graph of Top 10 Source Port
Figure 25 shows the graph of the attacks on honeypots from the top ten source port. Clearly, port
20974 was used for most attacks (24.47%) and port 1450 was used for least attacks (5.32%).
Consequently, port 20974 had the high incidence of attacks on the honeypots.
Attack Summary
The results of this study the shows the top five IP addresses from the world, the top five
countries of origin of the attacks, top 10 attacks by day, top 10 passwords and usernames used by
the intruders and the top ten sources port used for the attacks. The protocol used by attackers
was SSH. The study encountered two problems. Firstly, shipping the Honssh logs to the
logstash server for processing and indexing. It was resolved by installing Filebeat on the Bifrozt
Server. Secondly, setting up a grok patterns for logstash was challenging at the beginning but
was overcome by learning how to write the patterns based on the logs captured.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Future Work
Introduction
This chapter summarizes the methodology of the experiments used in the thesis. The
implications of the research results from the use of a real-time honeynet system to detect and
prevent attacks are discussed.
Conclusions
The research designed and implemented a real-time Honeynet system for detecting and
preventing system attacks. System services on Apache Webserver, MYSQL, FTP and SMTP
were used to lure attackers.
The experiment was conducted for 10 days. During this period, almost 500,000 attacks
were captured. The results of this study shows the top five IP addresses from the world; the top
five countries of origin of the attacks, top ten attacks by day, top ten passwords and usernames
used by the intruders, and the top ten sources port used for the attacks.
The question naturally arises on how to prevent high incidence of attacks. For example,
the results show high incidence of attacks from China with an IP address of 218.25.208.124.
Essentially a bash script such as the one shown below is required to fetch the IP address of China
or from any country with high incidence of attack and block it.
#!/bin/bash
###PUT HERE COMA SEPARATED LIST OF COUNTRY CODE###
COUNTRIES="AK,AR,BR,CN"
WORKDIR="/root"
*************************************************************
cd $WORKDIR
wget -c --output-document=iptables-blocklist.txt http://blogama.org/country_query.php?country=$COUNTRIES
if [ -f iptables-blocklist.txt ]; then
iptables -F
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BLOCKDB="iptables-blocklist.txt"
IPS=$(grep -Ev "^#" $BLOCKDB)
for i in $IPS
do
iptables -A INPUT -s $i -j DROP
iptables -A OUTPUT -d $i -j DROP
done
fi
rm $WORKDIR/iptables-blocklist.txt

The research results are useful for addressing two main questions:
Q1. How should open source technologies be used to dynamically add or modify hacking
incidences in a high-interaction honeynet system?
A1. Open-source technologies and methods were used to reduce the amount of manual
labor required to add to or modify a high-interaction honeynet system.
Q2. How should honeypots be made more attractive for hackers to spend more time to
provide hacking evidences?
A2. The honeypots attracted voluminous attacks and evidences of passwords, usernames,
and source ports from several countries. However, the File Transfer Protocol server on
Honeypot 3 appeared more lucrative for attackers, it attracted the most attacks of 2065
events.
Future Work
There is more research work that can be conducted to reduce the amount of manual
intervention required to add to or modify new honeypots to the honeynet system. In particular,
further study can pursue the use of a centralized system management called Ansible to capture
and record all activities performed on the honeypots. The design of countermeasure algorithms
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for redirecting all real attacks to an isolated honeypot for visual inspection by network
administrator is an intesting future areas for research. Further studies are required to establish
threshold boundary values of each type of network attacks.
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Appendix
Configuration file for SSH Server
class ssh (
$hiera_merge
$packages

= false,
= 'USE_DEFAULTS',

$permit_root_login
$purge_keys
$manage_firewall

= 'yes',
= true,
= false,

$ssh_package_source

= 'USE_DEFAULTS',

$ssh_package_adminfile

= 'USE_DEFAULTS',

$ssh_config_hash_known_hosts
$ssh_config_path

= 'USE_DEFAULTS',

= '/etc/ssh/ssh_config',

$ssh_config_owner

= 'root',

$ssh_config_group

= 'root',

$ssh_config_mode

= '0644',

$ssh_config_forward_x11

= undef,

$ssh_config_forward_x11_trusted
$ssh_config_forward_agent

= 'USE_DEFAULTS',
= undef,

$ssh_config_server_alive_interval

= undef,

$ssh_config_sendenv_xmodifiers

= false,

$ssh_config_ciphers

= undef,

$ssh_config_macs

= undef,

$ssh_config_use_roaming

= 'USE_DEFAULTS',

$ssh_config_template
$ssh_sendenv

= 'ssh/ssh_config.erb',
= 'USE_DEFAULTS',

$ssh_gssapiauthentication

= 'yes',

$ssh_gssapidelegatecredentials
$sshd_config_path
$sshd_config_owner

= undef,

= '/etc/ssh/sshd_config',
= 'root',
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$sshd_config_group

= 'root',

$sshd_config_loglevel

= 'INFO',

$sshd_config_mode

= 'USE_DEFAULTS',

$sshd_config_port

= '22',

$sshd_config_syslog_facility
$sshd_config_template

= 'AUTH',
= 'ssh/sshd_config.erb',

$sshd_config_login_grace_time

= '120',

$sshd_config_challenge_resp_auth
$sshd_config_print_motd
$sshd_config_use_dns

= 'yes',

= 'yes',
= 'USE_DEFAULTS',

$sshd_config_authkey_location

= undef,

$sshd_config_strictmodes

= undef,

$sshd_config_serverkeybits

= 'USE_DEFAULTS',

$sshd_config_banner

= 'none',

$sshd_config_ciphers

= undef,

$sshd_config_macs

= undef,

$sshd_config_allowgroups
$sshd_config_allowusers

= [],
= [],

$sshd_config_denygroups
$sshd_config_denyusers

= [],
= [],

$sshd_config_maxstartups

= undef,

$sshd_config_maxsessions

= undef,

$sshd_config_chrootdirectory

= undef,

$sshd_config_forcecommand
$sshd_config_match

= undef,
= undef,

$sshd_config_forcecommand
$sshd_config_match

= undef,
= undef,

$sshd_authorized_keys_command

= undef,

$sshd_authorized_keys_command_user = undef,
$sshd_banner_content

= undef,
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$sshd_banner_owner

= 'root',

$sshd_banner_group

= 'root',

$sshd_banner_mode

= '0644',

$sshd_config_xauth_location

= 'USE_DEFAULTS',

$sshd_config_subsystem_sftp

= 'USE_DEFAULTS',

$sshd_kerberos_authentication

= undef,

$sshd_password_authentication

= 'yes',

$sshd_allow_tcp_forwarding

= 'yes',

$sshd_x11_forwarding
$sshd_use_pam

= 'yes',
= 'USE_DEFAULTS',

$sshd_client_alive_count_max

= '3',

$sshd_client_alive_interval

= '0',

$sshd_gssapiauthentication

= 'yes',

$sshd_gssapikeyexchange

= 'USE_DEFAULTS',

$sshd_pamauthenticationviakbdint
$sshd_gssapicleanupcredentials
$sshd_acceptenv

= 'USE_DEFAULTS',
= 'USE_DEFAULTS',

= 'USE_DEFAULTS',

$sshd_config_hostkey

= 'USE_DEFAULTS',

$sshd_listen_address

= undef,

$sshd_hostbasedauthentication

= 'no',

$sshd_ignoreuserknownhosts

= 'no',

$sshd_ignorerhosts

= 'yes',

$manage_service

= true,

$sshd_addressfamily

= 'any',

$service_ensure

= 'running',

$service_name

= 'USE_DEFAULTS',

$service_enable

= true,

$service_hasrestart

= true,

$service_hasstatus

= 'USE_DEFAULTS',

$ssh_key_ensure

= 'present',
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$ssh_key_import

= true,

$ssh_key_type

= 'ssh-rsa',

$ssh_config_global_known_hosts_file = '/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts',
$ssh_config_global_known_hosts_owner = 'root',
$ssh_config_global_known_hosts_group = 'root',
$ssh_config_global_known_hosts_mode = '0644',
$keys

= undef,

$manage_root_ssh_config

= false,

$root_ssh_config_content

= "# This file is being maintained by Puppet.\n# DO

NOT $
){

case $::osfamily {
'RedHat': {
$default_packages

= ['openssh-server',
'openssh-clients']

$default_service_name

= 'sshd'

$default_ssh_config_hash_known_hosts

= 'no'

$default_ssh_config_forward_x11_trusted = 'yes'
$default_ssh_package_source

= undef

$default_ssh_package_adminfile
$default_ssh_sendenv

= undef
= true

$default_ssh_package_adminfile
$default_ssh_sendenv

= undef
= true

$default_ssh_config_use_roaming

= 'no'

$default_sshd_config_subsystem_sftp

= '/usr/libexec/openssh/sftp-server'

$default_sshd_config_mode

= '0600'

$default_sshd_config_use_dns

= 'yes'

$default_sshd_config_xauth_location
$default_sshd_use_pam

= '/usr/bin/xauth'

= 'yes'
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$default_sshd_gssapikeyexchange

= undef

$default_sshd_pamauthenticationviakbdint = undef
$default_sshd_gssapicleanupcredentials = 'yes'
$default_sshd_acceptenv

= true

$default_service_hasstatus

= true

$default_sshd_config_serverkeybits

= '1024'

$default_sshd_config_hostkey

= [ '/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key' ]

}
'Suse': {
$default_packages

= 'openssh'

$default_service_name

= 'sshd'

$default_ssh_config_hash_known_hosts
$default_ssh_package_source

= undef

$default_ssh_package_adminfile
$default_ssh_sendenv

= 'no'

= undef
= true

$default_ssh_config_use_roaming

= 'no'

$default_ssh_config_forward_x11_trusted = 'yes'
$default_sshd_config_mode

= '0600'

$default_sshd_config_use_dns

= 'yes'

$default_sshd_config_xauth_location
$default_sshd_use_pam
$default_sshd_gssapikeyexchange

= '/usr/bin/xauth'

= 'yes'
= undef

$default_sshd_pamauthenticationviakbdint = undef
$default_sshd_gssapicleanupcredentials = 'yes'
$default_sshd_acceptenv

= true

$default_service_hasstatus

= true

$default_sshd_config_serverkeybits
$default_sshd_config_hostkey
case $::architecture {
'x86_64': {

= '1024'
= [ '/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key' ]
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if ($::operatingsystem == 'SLES') and ($::operatingsystemrelease =~ /^12\./) {
$default_sshd_config_subsystem_sftp = '/usr/lib/ssh/sftp-server'
} else {
$default_sshd_config_subsystem_sftp = '/usr/lib64/ssh/sftp-server'
}
}
'i386' : {
$default_sshd_config_subsystem_sftp = '/usr/lib/ssh/sftp-server'
}
default: {
fail("ssh supports architectures x86_64 and i386 for Suse. Detected architecture is
<$
}
}
}
'Debian': {
$default_packages

= ['openssh-server',
'openssh-client']

$default_service_name

= 'ssh'
'openssh-client']

$default_service_name

= 'ssh'

$default_ssh_config_forward_x11_trusted = 'yes'
$default_ssh_config_hash_known_hosts
$default_ssh_package_source

= undef

$default_ssh_package_adminfile
$default_ssh_sendenv

= 'no'

= undef
= true

$default_ssh_config_use_roaming

= 'no'

$default_sshd_config_subsystem_sftp

= '/usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server'

$default_sshd_config_mode
$default_sshd_config_use_dns

= '0600'
= 'yes'
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$default_sshd_config_xauth_location
$default_sshd_use_pam

= '/usr/bin/xauth'

= 'yes'

$default_sshd_gssapikeyexchange

= undef

$default_sshd_pamauthenticationviakbdint = undef
$default_sshd_gssapicleanupcredentials = 'yes'
$default_sshd_acceptenv

= true

$default_service_hasstatus

= true

$default_sshd_config_serverkeybits

= '1024'

$default_sshd_config_hostkey

= [ '/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key' ]

}
'Solaris': {
$default_ssh_config_hash_known_hosts
$default_ssh_sendenv

= undef

= false

$default_ssh_config_forward_x11_trusted = undef
$default_ssh_config_use_roaming

= 'unset'

$default_sshd_config_subsystem_sftp

= '/usr/lib/ssh/sftp-server'

$default_sshd_config_mode

= '0644'

$default_sshd_config_use_dns

= undef

$default_sshd_config_xauth_location
$default_sshd_use_pam

= '/usr/openwin/bin/xauth'

= undef

$default_sshd_gssapikeyexchange

= 'yes'

$default_sshd_pamauthenticationviakbdint = 'yes'
$default_sshd_gssapicleanupcredentials = undef
$default_sshd_acceptenv

= false

$default_sshd_config_serverkeybits

= '768'

$default_ssh_package_adminfile

= undef

$default_sshd_config_hostkey

= [ '/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key' ]

case $::kernelrelease {
'5.11': {
$default_packages

= ['network/ssh',
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'network/ssh/ssh-key',
'service/network/ssh']
$default_service_name

= 'ssh'

$default_service_hasstatus
$default_ssh_package_source

= true
= undef

}
'5.10': {
$default_packages

= ['SUNWsshcu',
'SUNWsshdr',
'SUNWsshdu',
'SUNWsshr',
'SUNWsshu']

$default_service_name

= 'ssh'

$default_service_hasstatus
$default_ssh_package_source
$default_service_hasstatus
$default_ssh_package_source

= true
= '/var/spool/pkg'
= true
= '/var/spool/pkg'

}
'5.9' : {
$default_packages

= ['SUNWsshcu',
'SUNWsshdr',
'SUNWsshdu',
'SUNWsshr',
'SUNWsshu']

$default_service_name
$default_service_hasstatus
$default_ssh_package_source

= 'sshd'
= false
= '/var/spool/pkg'

}
default: {
fail('ssh module supports Solaris kernel release 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11.')
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}
}
}
default: {
fail("ssh supports osfamilies RedHat, Suse, Debian and Solaris. Detected osfamily is
<${:$
}
}

if $packages == 'USE_DEFAULTS' {
$packages_real = $default_packages
} else {
$packages_real = $packages
}

if $ssh_config_hash_known_hosts == 'USE_DEFAULTS' {
$ssh_config_hash_known_hosts_real = $default_ssh_config_hash_known_hosts
} else {
$ssh_config_hash_known_hosts_real = $ssh_config_hash_known_hosts
}

if $service_name == 'USE_DEFAULTS' {
$service_name_real = $default_service_name
} else {
$service_name_real = $service_name
}

if $sshd_config_subsystem_sftp == 'USE_DEFAULTS' {
$sshd_config_subsystem_sftp_real = $default_sshd_config_subsystem_sftp
} else {
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$sshd_config_subsystem_sftp_real = $sshd_config_subsystem_sftp
}

if $sshd_config_mode == 'USE_DEFAULTS' {
$sshd_config_mode_real = $default_sshd_config_mode
} else {
$sshd_config_mode_real = $sshd_config_mode
}

if $sshd_config_xauth_location == 'USE_DEFAULTS' {
$sshd_config_xauth_location_real = $default_sshd_config_xauth_location
} else {
$sshd_config_xauth_location_real = $default_sshd_config_xauth_location
} else {
$sshd_config_xauth_location_real = $sshd_config_xauth_location
}

if $sshd_config_xauth_location_real != undef {
validate_absolute_path($sshd_config_xauth_location_real)
}

if $ssh_package_source == 'USE_DEFAULTS' {
$ssh_package_source_real = $default_ssh_package_source
} else {
$ssh_package_source_real = $ssh_package_source
}

if $ssh_package_source_real != undef {
validate_absolute_path($ssh_package_source_real)
}
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if $ssh_package_adminfile == 'USE_DEFAULTS' {
$ssh_package_adminfile_real = $default_ssh_package_adminfile
} else {
$ssh_package_adminfile_real = $ssh_package_adminfile
}

if $ssh_package_adminfile_real != undef {
validate_absolute_path($ssh_package_adminfile_real)
}

if $sshd_config_use_dns == 'USE_DEFAULTS' {
$sshd_config_use_dns_real = $default_sshd_config_use_dns
} else {
$sshd_config_use_dns_real = $sshd_config_use_dns
}

if $sshd_use_pam == 'USE_DEFAULTS' {
$sshd_use_pam_real = $default_sshd_use_pam
} else {
$sshd_use_pam_real = $sshd_use_pam
}

if $sshd_config_serverkeybits == 'USE_DEFAULTS' {
$sshd_config_serverkeybits_real = $default_sshd_config_serverkeybits
} else {
$sshd_config_serverkeybits_real = $sshd_config_serverkeybits
}

if $ssh_config_forward_x11_trusted == 'USE_DEFAULTS' {
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$ssh_config_forward_x11_trusted_real = $default_ssh_config_forward_x11_trusted
} else {
$ssh_config_forward_x11_trusted_real = $ssh_config_forward_x11_trusted
}
if $ssh_config_forward_x11_trusted_real != undef {
validate_re($ssh_config_forward_x11_trusted_real, '^(yes|no)$',
"ssh::ssh_config_forward_x1$
}
$sshd_config_xauth_location_real = $default_sshd_config_xauth_location
} else {
$sshd_config_xauth_location_real = $sshd_config_xauth_location
}

if $sshd_config_xauth_location_real != undef {
validate_absolute_path($sshd_config_xauth_location_real)
}

if $ssh_package_source == 'USE_DEFAULTS' {
$ssh_package_source_real = $default_ssh_package_source
} else {
$ssh_package_source_real = $ssh_package_source
}

if $ssh_package_source_real != undef {
validate_absolute_path($ssh_package_source_real)
}

if $ssh_package_adminfile == 'USE_DEFAULTS' {
$ssh_package_adminfile_real = $default_ssh_package_adminfile
} else {

72
$ssh_package_adminfile_real = $ssh_package_adminfile
}

if $ssh_package_adminfile_real != undef {
validate_absolute_path($ssh_package_adminfile_real)
}

if $sshd_config_use_dns == 'USE_DEFAULTS' {
$sshd_config_use_dns_real = $default_sshd_config_use_dns
} else {
$sshd_config_use_dns_real = $sshd_config_use_dns
}

if $sshd_use_pam == 'USE_DEFAULTS' {
$sshd_use_pam_real = $default_sshd_use_pam
} else {
$sshd_use_pam_real = $sshd_use_pam
}

if $sshd_config_serverkeybits == 'USE_DEFAULTS' {
$sshd_config_serverkeybits_real = $default_sshd_config_serverkeybits
} else {
$sshd_config_serverkeybits_real = $sshd_config_serverkeybits
}

if $ssh_config_forward_x11_trusted == 'USE_DEFAULTS' {
$ssh_config_forward_x11_trusted_real = $default_ssh_config_forward_x11_trusted
} else {
$ssh_config_forward_x11_trusted_real = $ssh_config_forward_x11_trusted
}
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if $ssh_config_forward_x11_trusted_real != undef {
validate_re($ssh_config_forward_x11_trusted_real, '^(yes|no)$',
"ssh::ssh_config_forward_x1$
}

if $sshd_gssapikeyexchange == 'USE_DEFAULTS' {
$sshd_gssapikeyexchange_real = $default_sshd_gssapikeyexchange
} else {
$sshd_gssapikeyexchange_real = $sshd_gssapikeyexchange
}

if $sshd_pamauthenticationviakbdint == 'USE_DEFAULTS' {
$sshd_pamauthenticationviakbdint_real = $default_sshd_pamauthenticationviakbdint
} else {
$sshd_pamauthenticationviakbdint_real = $sshd_pamauthenticationviakbdint
}

if $sshd_gssapicleanupcredentials == 'USE_DEFAULTS' {
$sshd_gssapicleanupcredentials_real = $default_sshd_gssapicleanupcredentials
} else {
$sshd_gssapicleanupcredentials_real = $sshd_gssapicleanupcredentials
}

if $ssh_config_use_roaming == 'USE_DEFAULTS' {
$ssh_config_use_roaming_real = $default_ssh_config_use_roaming
} else {
$ssh_config_use_roaming_real = $ssh_config_use_roaming
}

if $ssh_sendenv == 'USE_DEFAULTS' {
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$ssh_sendenv_real = $default_ssh_sendenv
} else {
case type3x($ssh_sendenv) {
'string': {
validate_re($ssh_sendenv, '^(true|false)$', "ssh::ssh_sendenv may be either 'true' or
'$
$ssh_sendenv_real = str2bool($ssh_sendenv)
}
'boolean': {
$ssh_sendenv_real = $ssh_sendenv
}
default: {
fail('ssh::ssh_sendenv type must be true or false.')
}
}
}

if $sshd_acceptenv == 'USE_DEFAULTS' {
$sshd_acceptenv_real = $default_sshd_acceptenv
} else {
case type3x($sshd_acceptenv) {
'string': {
validate_re($sshd_acceptenv, '^(true|false)$', "ssh::sshd_acceptenv may be either
'true$
$sshd_acceptenv_real = str2bool($sshd_acceptenv)
}
'boolean': {
$sshd_acceptenv_real = $sshd_acceptenv
}
default: {
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fail('ssh::sshd_acceptenv type must be true or false.')
default: {
fail('ssh::sshd_acceptenv type must be true or false.')
}
}
}

if $sshd_config_hostkey == 'USE_DEFAULTS' {
$sshd_config_hostkey_real = $default_sshd_config_hostkey
} else {
validate_array($sshd_config_hostkey)
validate_absolute_path(join($sshd_config_hostkey))
$sshd_config_hostkey_real = $sshd_config_hostkey
}

if $sshd_listen_address {
validate_array($sshd_listen_address)
}

if $service_hasstatus == 'USE_DEFAULTS' {
$service_hasstatus_real = $default_service_hasstatus
} else {
case type3x($service_hasstatus) {
'string': {
validate_re($service_hasstatus, '^(true|false)$', "ssh::service_hasstatus must be
'true$
$service_hasstatus_real = str2bool($service_hasstatus)
}
'boolean': {
$service_hasstatus_real = $service_hasstatus
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}
default: {
fail('ssh::service_hasstatus must be true or false.')
}
}
}

# validate params
if $ssh_config_ciphers != undef {
validate_array($ssh_config_ciphers)
}

if $sshd_config_ciphers != undef {
validate_array($sshd_config_ciphers)
}

if $ssh_config_macs != undef {
validate_array($ssh_config_macs)
}

if $sshd_config_macs != undef {
validate_array($sshd_config_macs)
}

if $ssh_config_hash_known_hosts_real != undef {
validate_re($ssh_config_hash_known_hosts_real, '^(yes|no)$',
"ssh::ssh_config_hash_known_ho$
}
validate_re($sshd_config_port, '^\d+$', "ssh::sshd_config_port must be a valid number
and is $
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}
validate_re($sshd_config_port, '^\d+$', "ssh::sshd_config_port must be a valid number
and is $
if $sshd_kerberos_authentication != undef {
validate_re($sshd_kerberos_authentication, '^(yes|no)$',
"ssh::sshd_kerberos_authentication$
}
validate_re($sshd_password_authentication, '^(yes|no)$',
"ssh::sshd_password_authentication m$
validate_re($sshd_allow_tcp_forwarding, '^(yes|no)$',
"ssh::sshd_allow_tcp_forwarding may be $
validate_re($sshd_x11_forwarding, '^(yes|no)$', "ssh::sshd_x11_forwarding may be
either 'yes'$
if $sshd_use_pam_real != undef {
validate_re($sshd_use_pam_real, '^(yes|no)$', "ssh::sshd_use_pam may be either 'yes'
or 'no$
}
if $sshd_config_serverkeybits_real != undef {
if is_integer($sshd_config_serverkeybits_real) == false {
fail("ssh::sshd_config_serverkeyb$
}
if $ssh_config_use_roaming_real != undef {
validate_re($ssh_config_use_roaming_real, '^(yes|no|unset)$',
"ssh::ssh_config_use_roaming $
}
if is_integer($sshd_client_alive_interval) == false {
fail("ssh::sshd_client_alive_interval m$
if is_integer($sshd_client_alive_count_max) == false {
fail("ssh::sshd_client_alive_count_max$
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if $sshd_config_banner != 'none' {
validate_absolute_path($sshd_config_banner)
}
if $sshd_banner_content != undef and $sshd_config_banner == 'none' {
fail('ssh::sshd_config_banner must be set to be able to use sshd_banner_content.')
}

validate_re($ssh_gssapiauthentication, '^(yes|no)$', "ssh::ssh_gssapiauthentication may
be ei$

if $ssh_gssapidelegatecredentials != undef {
validate_re($ssh_gssapidelegatecredentials, '^(yes|no)$',
"ssh::ssh_gssapidelegatecredentia$
}

validate_re($sshd_gssapiauthentication, '^(yes|no)$', "ssh::sshd_gssapiauthentication
may be $

if $sshd_gssapikeyexchange_real != undef {
validate_re($sshd_gssapikeyexchange_real, '^(yes|no)$',
"ssh::sshd_gssapikeyexchange may be$
}

if $sshd_pamauthenticationviakbdint_real != undef {
validate_re($sshd_pamauthenticationviakbdint_real, '^(yes|no)$',
"ssh::sshd_pamauthenticati$
}

if $sshd_gssapicleanupcredentials_real != undef {
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validate_re($sshd_gssapicleanupcredentials_real, '^(yes|no)$',
"ssh::sshd_gssapicleanupcred$
}

if $sshd_config_authkey_location != undef {
validate_string($sshd_config_authkey_location)
}

if $sshd_config_maxstartups != undef {
validate_re($sshd_config_maxstartups,'^(\d+)+(\d+?:\d+?:\d+)?$',
"ssh::sshd_config_maxstartups may be either an integer or three integers separated
with c$
}
if $sshd_config_maxsessions != undef {
$is_int_sshd_config_maxsessions = is_integer($sshd_config_maxsessions)
if $is_int_sshd_config_maxsessions == false {
fail("sshd_config_maxsessions must be an integer. Detected value is
${sshd_config_maxsess$
}
}

if $sshd_config_chrootdirectory != undef {
validate_absolute_path($sshd_config_chrootdirectory)
}

if $sshd_config_forcecommand != undef {
validate_string($sshd_config_forcecommand)
}

if $sshd_authorized_keys_command != undef {
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validate_absolute_path($sshd_authorized_keys_command)
}

if $sshd_authorized_keys_command_user != undef {
validate_string($sshd_authorized_keys_command_user)
}

if $sshd_config_match != undef {
validate_hash($sshd_config_match)
}

if $sshd_config_strictmodes != undef {
validate_re($sshd_config_strictmodes, '^(yes|no)$', "ssh::sshd_config_strictmodes
may be ei$
}

validate_re($sshd_hostbasedauthentication, '^(yes|no)$',
"ssh::sshd_hostbasedauthentication m$

validate_re($sshd_ignoreuserknownhosts, '^(yes|no)$',
"ssh::sshd_ignoreuserknownhosts may be $

validate_re($sshd_ignorerhosts, '^(yes|no)$', "ssh::sshd_ignorerhosts may be either
'yes' or $

case type3x($hiera_merge) {
'string': {
validate_re($hiera_merge, '^(true|false)$', "ssh::hiera_merge may be either 'true' or
'fa$
$hiera_merge_real = str2bool($hiera_merge)
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}
'boolean': {
$hiera_merge_real = $hiera_merge
}
default: {
fail('ssh::hiera_merge type must be true or false.')
}
}

case type3x($ssh_key_import) {
'string': {
validate_re($ssh_key_import, '^(true|false)$', "ssh::ssh_key_import may be either
'true' $
$ssh_key_import_real = str2bool($ssh_key_import)
validate_re($ssh_key_import, '^(true|false)$', "ssh::ssh_key_import may be either 'true'
$
$ssh_key_import_real = str2bool($ssh_key_import)
}
'boolean': {
$ssh_key_import_real = $ssh_key_import
}
default: {
fail('ssh::ssh_key_import type must be true or false.')
}
}
validate_bool($ssh_key_import_real)

case type3x($ssh_config_sendenv_xmodifiers) {
'string': {
$ssh_config_sendenv_xmodifiers_real = str2bool($ssh_config_sendenv_xmodifiers)
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}
'boolean': {
$ssh_config_sendenv_xmodifiers_real = $ssh_config_sendenv_xmodifiers
}
default: {
fail('ssh::ssh_config_sendenv_xmodifiers type must be true or false.')
}
}

case $permit_root_login {
'no', 'yes', 'without-password', 'forced-commands-only': {
# noop
}
default: {
fail("ssh::permit_root_login may be either 'yes', 'without-password', 'forcedcommands-on$
}
}

case $ssh_key_type {
'ssh-rsa','rsa': {
$key = $::sshrsakey
}
'ssh-dsa','dsa': {
$key = $::sshdsakey
}
default: {
fail("ssh::ssh_key_type must be 'ssh-rsa', 'rsa', 'ssh-dsa', or 'dsa' and is
<${ssh_key_t$
}
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}

validate_absolute_path($ssh_config_global_known_hosts_file)
validate_string($ssh_config_global_known_hosts_owner)
validate_string($ssh_config_global_known_hosts_group)
validate_re($ssh_config_global_known_hosts_mode, '^[0-7]{4}$',
"ssh::ssh_config_global_known_hosts_mode must be a valid 4 digit mode in octal
notation. De$

if type3x($purge_keys) == 'string' {
$purge_keys_real = str2bool($purge_keys)
} else {
$purge_keys_real = $purge_keys
}
$purge_keys_real = $purge_keys
}
validate_bool($purge_keys_real)

if type3x($manage_service) == 'string' {
$manage_service_real = str2bool($manage_service)
} else {
$manage_service_real = $manage_service
}
validate_bool($manage_service_real)

if type3x($service_enable) == 'string' {
$service_enable_real = str2bool($service_enable)
} else {
$service_enable_real = $service_enable
}
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validate_bool($service_enable_real)

if type3x($service_hasrestart) == 'string' {
$service_hasrestart_real = str2bool($service_hasrestart)
} else {
$service_hasrestart_real = $service_hasrestart
}
validate_bool($service_hasrestart_real)

if type3x($manage_root_ssh_config) == 'string' {
$manage_root_ssh_config_real = str2bool($manage_root_ssh_config)
} else {
$manage_root_ssh_config_real = $manage_root_ssh_config
}
validate_bool($manage_root_ssh_config_real)

#ssh_config template
validate_string($ssh_config_template)

#sshd_config template
validate_string($sshd_config_template)

#loglevel
$supported_loglevel_vals=['QUIET', 'FATAL', 'ERROR', 'INFO', 'VERBOSE']
validate_re($sshd_config_loglevel, $supported_loglevel_vals)

#enable hiera merging for groups and users
if $hiera_merge_real == true {
$sshd_config_allowgroups_real = hiera_array('ssh::sshd_config_allowgroups',[])
$sshd_config_allowusers_real = hiera_array('ssh::sshd_config_allowusers',[])
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$sshd_config_denygroups_real = hiera_array('ssh::sshd_config_denygroups',[])
$sshd_config_denyusers_real = hiera_array('ssh::sshd_config_denyusers',[])
} else {
$sshd_config_allowgroups_real = $sshd_config_allowgroups
$sshd_config_allowusers_real = $sshd_config_allowusers
$sshd_config_denygroups_real = $sshd_config_denygroups
$sshd_config_denyusers_real = $sshd_config_denyusers
}

if $sshd_config_denyusers_real != [] {
if $sshd_config_denyusers_real != [] {
validate_array($sshd_config_denyusers_real)
}

if $sshd_config_denygroups_real != [] {
validate_array($sshd_config_denygroups_real)
}

if $sshd_config_allowusers_real != [] {
validate_array($sshd_config_allowusers_real)
}

if $sshd_config_allowgroups_real != [] {
validate_array($sshd_config_allowgroups_real)
}

package { $packages_real:
ensure

=> installed,

source => $ssh_package_source_real,
adminfile => $ssh_package_adminfile_real,
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}

file { 'ssh_config' :
ensure => file,
path

=> $ssh_config_path,

owner => $ssh_config_owner,
group => $ssh_config_group,
mode => $ssh_config_mode,
content => template($ssh_config_template),
require => Package[$packages_real],
}

file { 'sshd_config' :
ensure => file,
path

=> $sshd_config_path,

mode => $sshd_config_mode_real,
owner => $sshd_config_owner,
group => $sshd_config_group,
content => template($sshd_config_template),
require => Package[$packages_real],
}

if $sshd_config_banner != 'none' and $sshd_banner_content != undef {
file { 'sshd_banner' :
ensure => file,
path

=> $sshd_config_banner,

owner => $sshd_banner_owner,
group => $sshd_banner_group,
mode => $sshd_banner_mode,
content => $sshd_banner_content,
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require => Package[$packages_real],
}
}

if $manage_root_ssh_config_real == true {

if $sshd_config_denyusers_real != [] {
validate_array($sshd_config_denyusers_real)
}

if $sshd_config_denygroups_real != [] {
validate_array($sshd_config_denygroups_real)
}

if $sshd_config_allowusers_real != [] {
validate_array($sshd_config_allowusers_real)
}

if $sshd_config_allowgroups_real != [] {
validate_array($sshd_config_allowgroups_real)
}

package { $packages_real:
ensure

=> installed,

source => $ssh_package_source_real,
adminfile => $ssh_package_adminfile_real,
}

file { 'ssh_config' :
ensure => file,
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path

=> $ssh_config_path,

owner => $ssh_config_owner,
group => $ssh_config_group,
mode => $ssh_config_mode,
content => template($ssh_config_template),
require => Package[$packages_real],
}

file { 'sshd_config' :
ensure => file,
path

=> $sshd_config_path,

mode => $sshd_config_mode_real,
owner => $sshd_config_owner,
group => $sshd_config_group,
content => template($sshd_config_template),
require => Package[$packages_real],
}

if $sshd_config_banner != 'none' and $sshd_banner_content != undef {
file { 'sshd_banner' :
ensure => file,
path

=> $sshd_config_banner,

owner => $sshd_banner_owner,
group => $sshd_banner_group,
mode => $sshd_banner_mode,
content => $sshd_banner_content,
require => Package[$packages_real],
}
}
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if $manage_root_ssh_config_real == true {
if $manage_root_ssh_config_real == true {

include ::common

common::mkdir_p { "${::root_home}/.ssh": }

file { 'root_ssh_dir':
ensure => directory,
path

=> "${::root_home}/.ssh",

owner => 'root',
group => 'root',
mode => '0700',
require => Common::Mkdir_p["${::root_home}/.ssh"],
}

file { 'root_ssh_config':
ensure => file,
path

=> "${::root_home}/.ssh/config",

content => $root_ssh_config_content,
owner => 'root',
group => 'root',
mode => '0600',
}
}

if $manage_service_real {
service { 'sshd_service' :
ensure

=> $service_ensure,

name

=> $service_name_real,
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enable

=> $service_enable_real,

hasrestart => $service_hasrestart_real,
hasstatus => $service_hasstatus_real,
subscribe => File['sshd_config'],
}
}

if $manage_firewall == true {
firewall { '22 open port 22 for SSH':
action => 'accept',
dport => 22,
proto => 'tcp',
}
}

# export each node's ssh key
@@sshkey { $::fqdn :
ensure => $ssh_key_ensure,
type => $ssh_key_type,
key

=> $key,

}

file { 'ssh_known_hosts':
ensure => file,
path => $ssh_config_global_known_hosts_file,
owner => $ssh_config_global_known_hosts_owner,
path => $ssh_config_global_known_hosts_file,
owner => $ssh_config_global_known_hosts_owner,
group => $ssh_config_global_known_hosts_group,
mode => $ssh_config_global_known_hosts_mode,
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}

# import all nodes' ssh keys
if $ssh_key_import_real == true {
Sshkey <<||>> {
target => $ssh_config_global_known_hosts_file,
}
}

# remove ssh key's not managed by puppet
resources { 'sshkey':
purge => $purge_keys_real,
}

# manage users' ssh authorized keys if present
if $keys != undef {
if $hiera_merge_real == true {
$keys_real = hiera_hash('ssh::keys')
} else {
$keys_real = $keys
notice('Future versions of the ssh module will default ssh::hiera_merge_real to true')
}
validate_hash($keys_real)
create_resources('ssh_authorized_key', $keys_real)
}

if $sshd_addressfamily != undef {
validate_re($sshd_addressfamily, '^(any|inet|inet6)$',
"ssh::sshd_addressfamily can be undef, 'any', 'inet' or 'inet6' and is set to
${sshd_addr$
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}
}
Configuration file for NTP Server
class ntp (
$autoupdate

= $ntp::params::autoupdate,

$broadcastclient = $ntp::params::broadcastclient,
$config

= $ntp::params::config,

$config_template = $ntp::params::config_template,
$disable_auth

= $ntp::params::disable_auth,

$disable_monitor = $ntp::params::disable_monitor,
$fudge

= $ntp::params::fudge,

$driftfile

= $ntp::params::driftfile,

$leapfile

= $ntp::params::leapfile,

$logfile

= $ntp::params::logfile,

$iburst_enable

= $ntp::params::iburst_enable,

$keys_enable

= $ntp::params::keys_enable,

$keys_file

= $ntp::params::keys_file,

$keys_controlkey = $ntp::params::keys_controlkey,
$keys_requestkey = $ntp::params::keys_requestkey,
$keys_trusted

= $ntp::params::keys_trusted,

$minpoll

= $ntp::params::minpoll,

$maxpoll

= $ntp::params::maxpoll,

$package_ensure = $ntp::params::package_ensure,
$package_manage = $ntp::params::package_manage,
$package_name

= $ntp::params::package_name,

$panic

= $ntp::params::panic,

$peers

= $ntp::params::peers,

$preferred_servers = $ntp::params::preferred_servers,
$restrict
$interfaces
$servers

= $ntp::params::restrict,
= $ntp::params::interfaces,
= $ntp::params::servers,

$service_enable = $ntp::params::service_enable,
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$service_ensure = $ntp::params::service_ensure,
$service_manage = $ntp::params::service_manage,
$service_name
$stepout

= $ntp::params::service_name,
= $ntp::params::stepout,

$tinker

= $ntp::params::tinker,

$udlc

= $ntp::params::udlc,

$udlc_stratum

= $ntp::params::udlc_stratum,

) inherits ntp::params {

validate_bool($broadcastclient)
validate_absolute_path($config)
validate_string($config_template)
validate_bool($disable_auth)
validate_bool($disable_monitor)
validate_absolute_path($driftfile)
if $logfile { validate_absolute_path($logfile) }
if $leapfile { validate_absolute_path($leapfile) }
validate_bool($iburst_enable)
validate_bool($keys_enable)
validate_re($keys_controlkey, ['^\d+$', ''])
validate_re($keys_requestkey, ['^\d+$', ''])
validate_array($keys_trusted)
if $minpoll { validate_numeric($minpoll, 16, 3) }
if $maxpoll { validate_numeric($maxpoll, 16, 3) }
validate_string($package_ensure)
validate_bool($package_manage)
validate_array($package_name)
validate_bool($package_manage)
validate_array($package_name)
if $panic { validate_numeric($panic, 65535, 0) }
validate_array($preferred_servers)
validate_array($restrict)
validate_array($interfaces)
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validate_array($servers)
validate_array($fudge)
validate_bool($service_enable)
validate_string($service_ensure)
validate_bool($service_manage)
validate_string($service_name)
if $stepout { validate_numeric($stepout, 65535, 0) }
validate_bool($tinker)
validate_bool($udlc)
validate_array($peers)

if $autoupdate {
notice('autoupdate parameter has been deprecated and replaced with package_ensure. Set
thi$
}

# Anchor this as per #8040 - this ensures that classes won't float off and
# mess everything up. You can read about this at:
# http://docs.puppetlabs.com/puppet/2.7/reference/lang_containment.html#known-issues
anchor { 'ntp::begin': } ->
class { '::ntp::install': } ->
class { '::ntp::config': } ~>
class { '::ntp::service': } ->
anchor { 'ntp::end': }

}

Configuration file for Apache Server
class apache (
$apache_name

= $::apache::params::apache_name,

$service_name

= $::apache::params::service_name,

$default_mods

= true,

$default_vhost

= true,
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$default_charset

= undef,

$default_confd_files = true,
$default_ssl_vhost

= false,

$default_ssl_cert

= $::apache::params::default_ssl_cert,

$default_ssl_key

= $::apache::params::default_ssl_key,

$default_ssl_chain
$default_ssl_ca

= undef,
= undef,

$default_ssl_crl_path = undef,
$default_ssl_crl

= undef,

$default_ssl_crl_check = undef,
$default_type

= 'none',

$dev_packages
$ip

= $::apache::params::dev_packages,
= undef,

$service_enable

= true,

$service_manage

= true,

$service_ensure

= 'running',

$service_restart

= undef,

$purge_configs

= true,

$purge_vhost_dir

= undef,

$purge_vdir

= false,

$serveradmin
$sendfile

= 'root@localhost',
= 'On',

$error_documents

= false,

$timeout

= '120',

$httpd_dir

= $::apache::params::httpd_dir,

$server_root

= $::apache::params::server_root,

$conf_dir

= $::apache::params::conf_dir,

$confd_dir

= $::apache::params::confd_dir,

$vhost_dir

= $::apache::params::vhost_dir,

$vhost_enable_dir

= $::apache::params::vhost_enable_dir,

$vhost_include_pattern = $::apache::params::vhost_include_pattern,
$mod_dir
$mod_enable_dir

= $::apache::params::mod_dir,
= $::apache::params::mod_enable_dir,
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$mpm_module

= $::apache::params::mpm_module,

$lib_path

= $::apache::params::lib_path,

$conf_template

= $::apache::params::conf_template,

$servername

= $::apache::params::servername,

$conf_template

= $::apache::params::conf_template,

$servername

= $::apache::params::servername,

$pidfile

= $::apache::params::pidfile,

$rewrite_lock

= undef,

$manage_user

= true,

$manage_group
$user

= true,
= $::apache::params::user,

$group
$keepalive

= $::apache::params::group,
= $::apache::params::keepalive,

$keepalive_timeout

= $::apache::params::keepalive_timeout,

$max_keepalive_requests = $::apache::params::max_keepalive_requests,
$limitreqfieldsize
$logroot
$logroot_mode
$log_level
$log_formats

= '8190',
= $::apache::params::logroot,
= $::apache::params::logroot_mode,
= $::apache::params::log_level,
= {},

$ports_file

= $::apache::params::ports_file,

$docroot

= $::apache::params::docroot,

$apache_version
$server_tokens
$server_signature
$trace_enable

= $::apache::version::default,
= 'OS',
= 'On',
= 'On',

$allow_encoded_slashes = undef,
$package_ensure

= 'installed',

$use_optional_includes = $::apache::params::use_optional_includes,
$use_systemd

= $::apache::params::use_systemd,

$mime_types_additional = $::apache::params::mime_types_additional,
$file_mode

= $::apache::params::file_mode,

) inherits ::apache::params {
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validate_bool($default_vhost)
validate_bool($default_ssl_vhost)
validate_bool($default_confd_files)
# true/false is sufficient for both ensure and enable
validate_bool($service_enable)
validate_bool($service_manage)
validate_bool($use_optional_includes)

$valid_mpms_re = $apache_version ? {
'2.4' => '(event|itk|peruser|prefork|worker)',
default => '(event|itk|prefork|worker)'
}

if $mpm_module and $mpm_module != 'false' { # lint:ignore:quoted_booleans
validate_re($mpm_module, $valid_mpms_re)
}

if $allow_encoded_slashes {
validate_re($allow_encoded_slashes, '(^on$|^off$|^nodecode$)', "${allow_encoded_slashes}
is$
}

# NOTE: on FreeBSD it's mpm module's responsibility to install httpd package.
# NOTE: the same strategy may be introduced for other OSes. For this, you
# should delete the 'if' block below and modify all MPM modules' manifests
# such that they include apache::package class (currently event.pp, itk.pp,
# peruser.pp, prefork.pp, worker.pp).
if $::osfamily != 'FreeBSD' {
# peruser.pp, prefork.pp, worker.pp).
if $::osfamily != 'FreeBSD' {
package { 'httpd':
ensure => $package_ensure,
name => $apache_name,
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notify => Class['Apache::Service'],
}
}
validate_re($sendfile, [ '^[oO]n$' , '^[oO]ff$' ])

# declare the web server user and group
# Note: requiring the package means the package ought to create them and not puppet
validate_bool($manage_user)
if $manage_user {
user { $user:
ensure => present,
gid

=> $group,

require => Package['httpd'],
}
}
validate_bool($manage_group)
if $manage_group {
group { $group:
ensure => present,
require => Package['httpd']
}
}

validate_apache_log_level($log_level)

class { '::apache::service':
service_name => $service_name,
service_enable => $service_enable,
service_manage => $service_manage,
service_ensure => $service_ensure,
service_restart => $service_restart,
}
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# Deprecated backwards-compatibility
if $purge_vdir {
warning('Class[\'apache\'] parameter purge_vdir is deprecated in favor of purge_configs')
$purge_confd = $purge_vdir
} else {
$purge_confd = $purge_configs
}

# Set purge vhostd appropriately
if $purge_vhost_dir == undef {
$purge_vhostd = $purge_confd
} else {
$purge_vhostd = $purge_vhost_dir
}

Exec {
path => '/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin',
}
path => '/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin',
}

exec { "mkdir ${confd_dir}":
creates => $confd_dir,
require => Package['httpd'],
}
file { $confd_dir:
ensure => directory,
recurse => true,
purge => $purge_confd,
notify => Class['Apache::Service'],
require => Package['httpd'],
}
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if ! defined(File[$mod_dir]) {
exec { "mkdir ${mod_dir}":
creates => $mod_dir,
require => Package['httpd'],
}
# Don't purge available modules if an enable dir is used
$purge_mod_dir = $purge_configs and !$mod_enable_dir
file { $mod_dir:
ensure => directory,
recurse => true,
purge => $purge_mod_dir,
notify => Class['Apache::Service'],
require => Package['httpd'],
}
}

if $mod_enable_dir and ! defined(File[$mod_enable_dir]) {
$mod_load_dir = $mod_enable_dir
exec { "mkdir ${mod_enable_dir}":
creates => $mod_enable_dir,
require => Package['httpd'],
}
file { $mod_enable_dir:
ensure => directory,
recurse => true,
purge => $purge_configs,
notify => Class['Apache::Service'],
require => Package['httpd'],
}
} else {
$mod_load_dir = $mod_dir
}
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if ! defined(File[$vhost_dir]) {
exec { "mkdir ${vhost_dir}":
creates => $vhost_dir,
require => Package['httpd'],
}
file { $vhost_dir:
ensure => directory,
recurse => true,
ensure => directory,
recurse => true,
purge => $purge_vhostd,
notify => Class['Apache::Service'],
require => Package['httpd'],
}
}

if $vhost_enable_dir and ! defined(File[$vhost_enable_dir]) {
$vhost_load_dir = $vhost_enable_dir
exec { "mkdir ${vhost_load_dir}":
creates => $vhost_load_dir,
require => Package['httpd'],
}
file { $vhost_enable_dir:
ensure => directory,
recurse => true,
purge => $purge_vhostd,
notify => Class['Apache::Service'],
require => Package['httpd'],
}
} else {
$vhost_load_dir = $vhost_dir
}
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concat { $ports_file:
owner => 'root',
group => $::apache::params::root_group,
mode => $::apache::file_mode,
notify => Class['Apache::Service'],
require => Package['httpd'],
}
concat::fragment { 'Apache ports header':
ensure => present,
target => $ports_file,
content => template('apache/ports_header.erb')
}

if $::apache::conf_dir and $::apache::params::conf_file {
case $::osfamily {
'debian': {
$error_log

= 'error.log'

$scriptalias

= '/usr/lib/cgi-bin'

$access_log_file

= 'access.log'

}
'redhat': {
$error_log

= 'error_log'

$scriptalias

= '/var/www/cgi-bin'

$access_log_file

= 'access_log'

}
'freebsd': {
$error_log

= 'httpd-error.log'

$scriptalias

= '/usr/local/www/apache24/cgi-bin'

$access_log_file

= 'httpd-access.log'

} 'gentoo': {
$error_log

= 'error.log'

} 'gentoo': {
$error_log

= 'error.log'
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$error_documents_path = '/usr/share/apache2/error'
$scriptalias

= '/var/www/localhost/cgi-bin'

$access_log_file

= 'access.log'

if is_array($default_mods) {
if versioncmp($apache_version, '2.4') >= 0 {
if defined('apache::mod::ssl') {
::portage::makeconf { 'apache2_modules':
content => concat($default_mods, [ 'authz_core', 'socache_shmcb' ]),
}
} else {
::portage::makeconf { 'apache2_modules':
content => concat($default_mods, 'authz_core'),
}
}
} else {
::portage::makeconf { 'apache2_modules':
content => $default_mods,
}
}
}

file { [
'/etc/apache2/modules.d/.keep_www-servers_apache-2',
'/etc/apache2/vhosts.d/.keep_www-servers_apache-2'
]:
ensure => absent,
require => Package['httpd'],
}
}
'Suse': {
$error_log

= 'error.log'

$scriptalias

= '/usr/lib/cgi-bin'
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$access_log_file

= 'access.log'

}
default: {
fail("Unsupported osfamily ${::osfamily}")
}
}

$apxs_workaround = $::osfamily ? {
'freebsd' => true,
default => false
}

if $rewrite_lock {
validate_absolute_path($rewrite_lock)
}

# Template uses:
# - $pidfile
# - $user
# - $group
# - $logroot
# - $group
# - $logroot
# - $error_log
# - $sendfile
# - $mod_dir
# - $ports_file
# - $confd_dir
# - $vhost_dir
# - $error_documents
# - $error_documents_path
# - $apxs_workaround
# - $keepalive
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# - $keepalive_timeout
# - $max_keepalive_requests
# - $server_root
# - $server_tokens
# - $server_signature
# - $trace_enable
# - $rewrite_lock
file { "${::apache::conf_dir}/${::apache::params::conf_file}":
ensure => file,
content => template($conf_template),
notify => Class['Apache::Service'],
require => [Package['httpd'], Concat[$ports_file]],
}

# preserve back-wards compatibility to the times when default_mods was
# only a boolean value. Now it can be an array (too)
if is_array($default_mods) {
class { '::apache::default_mods':
all => false,
mods => $default_mods,
}
} else {
class { '::apache::default_mods':
all => $default_mods,
}
}
class { '::apache::default_confd_files':
all => $default_confd_files
}
if $mpm_module and $mpm_module != 'false' { # lint:ignore:quoted_booleans
class { "::apache::mod::${mpm_module}": }
}
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$default_vhost_ensure = $default_vhost ? {
true => 'present',
false => 'absent'
}
$default_ssl_vhost_ensure = $default_ssl_vhost ? {
true => 'present',
false => 'absent'
}

::apache::vhost { 'node1':
ensure
port

=> $default_vhost_ensure,
=> 80,

docroot

=> '/var/www/html',

scriptalias

=> $scriptalias,

serveradmin

=> $serveradmin,

access_log_file => $access_log_file,
priority
ip

=> '15',
=> '192.168.1.12',

logroot_mode => $logroot_mode,
manage_docroot => $default_vhost,
}
$ssl_access_log_file = $::osfamily ? {
'freebsd' => $access_log_file,
default => "ssl_${access_log_file}",
}
::apache::vhost { 'default-ssl':
ensure
port
ssl

=> $default_ssl_vhost_ensure,
=> 443,
=> true,

docroot

=> $docroot,

scriptalias

=> $scriptalias,

serveradmin

=> $serveradmin,

access_log_file => $ssl_access_log_file,
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priority
ip

=> '15',
=> $ip,

logroot_mode => $logroot_mode,
manage_docroot => $default_ssl_vhost,
}
}

# This anchor can be used as a reference point for things that need to happen *after*
# all modules have been put in place.
anchor { '::apache::modules_set_up': }
}

Configuration file for MYSQL Server
# Class: mysql::server: See README.md for documentation.
class mysql::server (
$config_file

= $mysql::params::config_file,

$includedir

= $mysql::params::includedir,

$install_options

= undef,

$install_secret_file

= $mysql::params::install_secret_file,

$manage_config_file

= $mysql::params::manage_config_file,

$override_options

= {},

$package_ensure

= $mysql::params::server_package_ensure,

$package_manage
$package_name

= $mysql::params::server_package_manage,
= $mysql::params::server_package_name,
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$purge_conf_dir

= $mysql::params::purge_conf_dir,

$remove_default_accounts = false,
$restart

= $mysql::params::restart,

$root_group

= $mysql::params::root_group,

$mysql_group

= $mysql::params::mysql_group,

$root_password

= $mysql::params::root_password,

$service_enabled

= $mysql::params::server_service_enabled,

$service_manage

= $mysql::params::server_service_manage,

$service_name

= $mysql::params::server_service_name,

$service_provider

= $mysql::params::server_service_provider,

$create_root_user

= $mysql::params::create_root_user,

$create_root_my_cnf

= $mysql::params::create_root_my_cnf,

$users

= {},

$grants

= {},

$databases

= {},

# Deprecated parameters
$enabled

= undef,

$manage_service
$old_root_password

= undef,
= undef

) inherits mysql::params {

# Deprecated parameters.
if $enabled {
crit('This parameter has been renamed to service_enabled.')
$real_service_enabled = $enabled
} else {
$real_service_enabled = $service_enabled
}
if $manage_service {
crit('This parameter has been renamed to service_manage.')
$real_service_manage = $manage_service
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} else {
$real_service_manage = $service_manage
}
if $old_root_password {
warning('old_root_password is no longer used and will be removed in a future release')
}

# Create a merged together set of options. Rightmost hashes win over left.
$options = mysql_deepmerge($mysql::params::default_options, $override_options)

Class['mysql::server::root_password'] -> Mysql::Db <| |>

include '::mysql::server::install'
include '::mysql::server::config'
include '::mysql::server::installdb'
include '::mysql::server::service'
include '::mysql::server::root_password'
include '::mysql::server::providers'

if $remove_default_accounts {
class { '::mysql::server::account_security':
require => Anchor['mysql::server::end'],
}
}

anchor { 'mysql::server::start': }
anchor { 'mysql::server::end': }

if $restart {
Class['mysql::server::config'] ~>
Class['mysql::server::service']
}
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Anchor['mysql::server::start'] ->
Class['mysql::server::install'] ->
Class['mysql::server::config'] ->
Class['mysql::server::installdb'] ->
Class['mysql::server::service'] ->
Class['mysql::server::root_password'] ->
Class['mysql::server::providers'] ->
Anchor['mysql::server::end']
}

Configuration file for SSMTP Server
class ssmtp (
$default_mta

= $ssmtp::params::default_mta,

$root_email

= $ssmtp::params::root_email,

$mail_hub

= $ssmtp::params::mail_hub,

$revaliases

= $ssmtp::params::revaliases,

$from_line_override = $ssmtp::params::from_line_override,
$hostname

= undef,

$rewritedomain

= undef,

$authuser

= undef,

$authpass

= undef,

$authmethod
$usetls
$usestarttls

= undef,
= undef,
= undef,

$tlscert

= undef,

$tlskey

= undef,

$tls_ca_file

= undef,

$tls_ca_dir

= undef,

) inherits ssmtp::params {

# Start workflow
if $ssmtp::params::linux {
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# Containment
contain ssmtp::package
contain ssmtp::config
contain ssmtp::service
Class['ssmtp::package'] ->
Class['ssmtp::config'] ->
Class['ssmtp::service']
}
}
else {
warning('The current operating system is not supported!')
}
}

Configuration file for FTP Server
class vsftpd (
$confdir

= $::vsftpd::params::confdir,

$package_name

= $::vsftpd::params::package_name,

$service_name
$template

= $::vsftpd::params::service_name,
= 'vsftpd/vsftpd.conf.erb',

# vsftpd.conf options
$anonymous_enable

= 'NO',

$local_enable

= 'YES',

$write_enable

= 'YES',

$local_umask

= '022',

$anon_upload_enable

= 'NO',

$anon_mkdir_write_enable = 'NO',
$dirmessage_enable
$xferlog_enable

= 'YES',
= 'YES',

$connect_from_port_20 = 'YES',
$chown_uploads
$chown_username
$xferlog_file

= 'NO',
= undef,
= '/var/log/vsftpd.log',
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$xferlog_std_format

= 'YES',

$idle_session_timeout = '600',
$data_connection_timeout = '120',
$nopriv_user

= undef,

$async_abor_enable

= 'NO',

$ascii_upload_enable

= 'NO',

$ascii_download_enable = 'NO',
$ftpd_banner

= 'FTP SERVER',

$chroot_local_user

= 'YES',

$chroot_list_enable

= 'NO',

$chroot_list_file

= '/etc/vsftpd/chroot_list',

$ls_recurse_enable
$listen
$listen_port

= 'NO',

= 'YES',
= undef,

$pam_service_name

= 'vsftpd',

$userlist_enable

= 'YES',

$userlist_deny

= undef,

$tcp_wrappers

= 'YES',

$hide_file

= undef,

$hide_ids

= 'NO',

$setproctitle_enable

= 'NO',

$text_userdb_names

= 'NO',

$max_clients

= undef,

$max_per_ip

= undef,

$pasv_min_port

= undef,

$pasv_max_port

= undef,

$ftp_username
$banner_file

= undef,
= undef,

$allow_writeable_chroot = undef,
$directives

= {},

) inherits ::vsftpd::params {

package { $package_name: ensure => installed }
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service { $service_name:
require => Package[$package_name],
enable => true,
ensure

=> running,

hasstatus => true,
}

file { "${confdir}/vsftpd.conf":
require => Package[$package_name],
content => template($template),
notify => Service[$service_name],
}
}

Honssh Configuration
#
# HonSSH configuration file (honssh.cfg)
#
#----------------------------------------------#
#
GENERAL SETUP
#
#----------------------------------------------#
#-----------------------#
#
HONEYPOT
#
#-----------------------#
[honeypot]
# IP addresses to listen for incoming SSH connections.
#
# input: IP Address
# required: YES
ssh_addr = 192.168.1.5
# Port to listen for incoming SSH connections.
#
# input: Number
# required: YES
# default: 2222
ssh_port = 22
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# IP addresses to send outgoing SSH connections.
# 0.0.0.0 for all interfaces
#
# input: IP Address
# required: YES
client_addr = 0.0.0.0
# Public and private SSH key files.
#
# input: Text
# required: YES
# default: id_rsa.pub
# default: id_rsa
# default: id_dsa.pub
# default: id_dsa
public_key = id_rsa.pub
private_key = id_rsa
public_key_dsa = id_dsa.pub
private_key_dsa = id_dsa
# SSH banner to send to clients
# If not specified, HonSSH will try and obtain it by connecting to
# honey_addr:honey_port
#
# input: text
# required: No
# default:
ssh_banner =
#-----------------------#
# HONEYPOT STATIC #
#-----------------------#
[honeypot-static]
# Documentation to come, stick with these options and ignore honeypot-* unless you know what you are
doing or fancy a challenge
enabled = false
# Should HonSSH use this plugin to get the honeypot details (before authentication)
pre-auth = false
# Should HonSSH use this plugin to get the honeypot details (after authentication)
post-auth = false
# This name will be used when logging to any of the output mechanisms.
# Please ensure it is meaningful.
#
# input: Text
# required: YES
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sensor_name =
# IP addresses of the honeypot.
#
# input: IP Address
# required: YES
honey_ip = 192.168.1.12
# SSH port of the honeypot.
#
# input: Number
# required: YES
# default: 22
honey_port = 22
#-----------------------#
# HONEYPOT SCRIPT #
#-----------------------#
[honeypot-script]
# Documentation to come
enabled = true
# Should HonSSH use this plugin to get the honeypot details (before authentication)
pre-auth = true
# Should HonSSH use this plugin to get the honeypot details (after authentication)
post-auth = true
# ./script IP LOCALIP PORT LOCALPORT
pre-auth-script =/usr/local/sbin/pot.py
# ./script IP LOCALIP PORT LOCALPORT USERNAME PASSWORD
post-auth-script =/usr/local/sbin/pot.py
#-----------------------#
# HONEYPOT DOCKER
#-----------------------#
[honeypot-docker]
# Documentation to come
enabled = false

#

# Should HonSSH use this plugin to get the honeypot details (before authentication)
pre-auth = false
# Should HonSSH use this plugin to get the honeypot details (after authentication)
post-auth = false
# image: image id/name to use for honeypot container
# required: if enabled = true
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image =
# uri: socket to interact with container daemon
# required: if enabled = true
# default: unix://var/run/docker.sock
uri = unix://var/run/docker.sock
# honey_hostname: the hostname for the container
# required: if enabled = true
hostname = test-box
# launch_cmd: command to run when container is first launched
# required: if enabled = true
# default = service ssh start
launch_cmd = service ssh start
# SSH port of the honeypot.
#
# input: Number
# required: YES
# default: 22
honey_port =
#-----------------------#
# HONEYPOT RESTRICTIONS #
#-----------------------#
[hp-restrict]
# When enabled, HonSSH will restrict connections to password only and decline any public keys.
# HonSSH will not work with public keys - this should always be true.
#
# input: true/false
# required: YES
# default: true
disable_publicKey = true
# When enabled, HonSSH will block any attempts to start an X11 session.
# You can allow X11 but HonSSH will not log the session.
#
# input: true/false
# required: YES
# default: true
disable_x11 = true
# When enabled, HonSSH will block any attempts to start an SFTP session.
# HonSSH will log SFTP traffic and capture downloaded files.
#
# input: true/false
# required: YES
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# default: false
disable_sftp = false
# When enabled, HonSSH will block any attempts to start an EXEC session.
# HonSSH will log all EXEC sessions, including SCP transfers.
#
# input: true/false
# required: YES
# default: false
disable_exec = false
# When enabled, HonSSH will block any attempts to start running port forwarding over SSH.
# You can allow port forwarding but HonSSH will not log the session - Yet! (log to PCAP?)
#
# input: true/false
# required: YES
# default: true
disable_port_forwarding = true
#-----------------------#
# OUTPUT DIRECTORIES #
#-----------------------#
[folders]
# Directory where log files will be saved in.
#
# input: Text
# required: YES
# default: logs
log_path = logs
# Directory where session files will be saved in.
#
# input: Text
# required: YES
# default: sessions
session_path = sessions
#-----------------------#
# ADVANCED NETWORKING #
#-----------------------#
[advNet]
# To enable this HonSSH must be ran as root or an account allowed to run
# iptables and ip link/addr commands.
#
# With this disabled, the honeypot will always see connections coming from
# honey_addr. With this enabled, connections will look as if the connections
# are coming from the attacker.
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# See the Wiki page for more details.
# https://github.com/tnich/honssh/wiki/Advanced-Networking
#
# input: true/false
# required: YES
# default: false
enabled = false
#-----------------------#
# LIVE INTERACTION #
#-----------------------#
[interact]
# Session management interface.
#
# This is a TCP based service that can be used to interact with active
# sessions. Disabled by default.
#
# Use honsshInteraction.py to interact with this interface.
#
# input: true/false
# required: YES
# default: false
enabled = false
# Interface to create the interaction on - 0.0.0.0 for all.
#
# input: IP Address
# required: if interact_enabled = true
# default: 127.0.0.1
interface = 127.0.0.1
# Port to create the interaction on
#
# input: Number
# required: if interact_enabled = true
# default: 5123
port = 5123
#-----------------------#
# PASSWORD SPOOFING #
#-----------------------#
[spoof]
# Enabling this will allow HonSSH to spoof an incorrect password with the real password.
# A list of users and passwords must be defined in the users.cfg file.
#
# Passwords to spoof can either be a fixed list or a random chance.
#
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# See the Wiki page for more details.
# https://github.com/tnich/honssh/wiki/Password-Spoofing
#
# input: true/false
# required: YES
# default: false
enabled = true
# Location of the users.cfg file
#
# input: text
# required: if enabled is true
# default: users.cfg
users_conf = users.cfg
#----------------------------------------------#
#
LOGGING AND OUTPUTS
#----------------------------------------------#

#

#-----------------------#
# FILE DOWNLOADING #
#-----------------------#
[download]
# File Download
#
# HonSSH will attempt to download all scp and sftp files to a local store if this is true
#
# input: true/false
# required: YES
# default: false
passive = true
# HonSSH wil attempt to download all wget files to a local store.
#
# I believe another tool should be used to passively capture all http(s) connections on all ports - maybe
the next project?
# Until then HonSSH will use a 'best effort' approach to capture files when the wget commands is
detected.
# It will not be able to capture commands such as:
# url=www.test.url; wget $url
#
# input: true/false
# required: YES
# default: false
active = true
#-----------------------#
# TEXT LOGGING

#
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#-----------------------#
[output-txtlog]
# All activity will be logged to text files
# A log of entry attempts will be kept in log_path/
# A log of session activity will be kept in session_path/
#
# input: true/false
# required: YES
# default: true
enabled = true
#-----------------------#
# MYSQL LOGGING #
#-----------------------#
[output-mysql]
# All activity will be logged to a MYSQL Database
# Database structure for this module is supplied in utils/honssh.sql
#
# input: true/false
# required: yes
# default: false
enabled = false
# IP address of the database
#
# input: IP Address
# required: if enabled = true
# default: localhost
host =
# Port to connect to the database on
#
# input: Number
# required: NO
# default: 3306
port = 3306
# Name of the database
#
# input: Text
# required: if enabled = true
database =
# Username to authenticate with the database
#
# input: Text
# required: if enabled = true
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username =
# Password to authenticate with the database
#
# input: Text
# required: if enabled = true
password =
#-----------------------#
# EMAIL LOGGING #
#-----------------------#
[output-email]
# Enable email output plugin
#
# dependency: txtlog MUST be enabled
# input: true/false
# required: YES
# default: false
enabled = false
# Send an email upon hacker connect
#
# dependency: txtlog MUST be enabled
# input: true/false
# required: YES
# default: false
login = false
# Send an email upon hacker disconnect - Will attach the tty log file
#
# dependency: txtlog MUST be enabled
# input: true/false
# required: YES
# default: false
attack = false
# Your SMTP Host
#
# input: Text
# required: if login or attack = true
host =
# Your SMTP Port
#
# input: Number
# required: if login or attack = true
port =
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# Use SSL/TLS to connect to the SMTP provider?
#
# input: true/false
# required: if login or attack = true
# default: true
use_tls = true
# Does your SMTP provider require a login?
#
# input: true/false
# required: if login or attack = true
# default: true
use_smtpauth = true
# Your SMTP login username
#
# input: Text
# required: if use_smtpauth = true
username =
# Your SMTP login password
#
# input: Text
# required: if use_smtpauth = true
password =
# The address the email is sent from
#
# input: Email Address
# required: if login or attack = true
from =
# The address(es) the email is sent to
#
# input: Email Addresses in a comma seperated list spaces without
# required: if login or attack = true
to =
#-----------------------#
#
HP FEEDS
#
#-----------------------#
[output-hpfeeds]
# All activity will be logged to a hpfeeds broker for dissemination
# between the honeypot community.
# Authentication attempts will be logged to honssh.auth
# Sessions will be logged to honssh.sessions
#
# input: true/false
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# required: yes
# default: false
enabled = false
# The server address of the hpfeeds broker
#
# input: Text
# required: if enabled = true
server =
# The server port of the hpfeeds broker
#
# input: Number
# required: if enabled = true
port =
# Your hpfeed authe key identifier
#
# input: Text
# required: if enabled = true
identifier =
# Your hpfeed authe key secret
#
# input: Text
# required: if enabled = true
secret =
#-----------------------#
# APPLICATION HOOKS #
#-----------------------#
[output-app_hooks]
# Enable app_hooks output plugin
#
# input: true/false
# required: YES
# default: false
enabled = false
# If you want any other application hooks or arguments passing, raise an issue
# on the HonSSH code page.
# Calls the script when a connection is made with the following arguments
# ./script CONNECTION_MADE DATETIME IP PORT HONEYIP HONEYPORT SESSION_ID
#
# input: path of script to run
# required: NO
connection_made =
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# Calls the script when a connection is lost with the following arguments
# ./script CONNECTION_LOST DATETIME IP PORT HONEYIP HONEYPORT SESSION_ID
#
# input: path of script to run
# required: NO
connection_lost =
# Calls the script when a login is successful with the following arguments
# ./script LOGIN_SUCCESSFUL DATETIME IP USERNAME PASSWORD
#
# input: path of script to run
# required: NO
login_successful =
# Calls the script when a login has failed with the following arguments
# ./script LOGIN_FAILED DATETIME IP USERNAME PASSWORD
#
# input: path of script to run
# required: NO
login_failed =
# Calls the script when a channel is opened with the following arguments
# ./script CHANNEL_OPENED DATETIME NAME CHANNEL_ID
#
# input: path of script to run
# required: NO
channel_opened =
# Calls the script when a channel is closed with the following arguments
# ./script CHANNEL_CLOSED DATETIME NAME CHANNEL_ID
#
# input: path of script to run
# required: NO
channel_closed =
# Calls the script when a command is entered with the following arguments
# ./script COMMAND_ENTERED DATETIME CHANNEL_ID COMMAND
#
# input: path of script to run
# required: NO
command_entered =
# Calls the script when a file download is started with the following arguments
# ./script DOWNLOAD_STARTED DATETIME CHANNEL_ID LINK FILE_PATH
#
# input: path of script to run
# required: NO
download_started =
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# Calls the script when a file download is finished with the following arguments
# ./script DOWNLOAD_FININSHED DATETIME CHANNEL_ID LINK FILE_PATH
#
# input: path of script to run
# required: NO
download_finished =
#-----------------------#
# PACKET LOGGING #
#-----------------------#
[packet_logging]
# Set to true to enable plugins to use the packet_logged function
#
# input: true/false
# required: YES
# default: false
enabled = true
[output-packets]
# Log all SSH Packets to text file (.log-adv)
#
# dependency: packet_logging MUST be enabled
# input: true/false
# required: YES
# default: false
enabled = true

Summary of the data (attacks)
016-04-12 14:35:18-0500 [-] Starting factory <honssh.client.HonsshClientFactory instance at
0x7fe42c703830>
2016-04-12 14:35:18-0500 [Uninitialized] [CLIENT] - New client connection
2016-04-12 14:35:18-0500 [HonsshClientTransport,client] kex alg, key alg: diffie-hellman-groupexchange-sha1 ssh-rsa
2016-04-12 14:35:18-0500 [HonsshClientTransport,client] outgoing: aes256-ctr hmac-sha1 none
2016-04-12 14:35:18-0500 [HonsshClientTransport,client] incoming: aes256-ctr hmac-sha1 none
2016-04-12 14:35:18-0500 [HonsshClientTransport,client] REVERSE
2016-04-12 14:35:18-0500 [HonsshClientTransport,client] NEW KEYS
2016-04-12 14:35:18-0500 [HonsshClientTransport,client] [CLIENT] - Client Connection Secured
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2016-04-12 14:35:18-0500 [HonsshServerTransport,3442,121.12.127.94] kex alg, key alg: diffiehellman-group1-sha1 ssh-rsa
2016-04-12 14:35:18-0500 [HonsshServerTransport,3442,121.12.127.94] outgoing: aes128-ctr hmacsha1 none
2016-04-12 14:35:18-0500 [HonsshServerTransport,3442,121.12.127.94] incoming: aes128-ctr hmacsha1 none
2016-04-12 14:35:18-0500 [-] [PLUGIN][EXAMPLE] - SET_SERVER
2016-04-12 14:35:18-0500 [-] [PLUGIN][EXAMPLE] - SET SERVER
2016-04-12 14:35:18-0500 [-] [PLUGIN][OUTPUT-TXTLOG] - CONNECTION_MADE
2016-04-12 14:35:18-0500 [-] [PLUGIN][EXAMPLE] - CONNECTION_MADE
2016-04-12 14:35:18-0500 [-] [PLUGIN][EXAMPLE] - {'honey_port': '22', 'sensor_name': 'node2',
'session': {'auths': [], 'country': 'China', 'start_time': '20160412_143518_928962', 'log_location':
'sessions/n$
2016-04-12 14:35:18-0500 [-] [PLUGIN][EXAMPLE] - SET_CLIENT
2016-04-12 14:35:18-0500 [-] [PLUGIN][EXAMPLE] - {'honey_port': '22', 'sensor_name': 'node2',
'session': {'auths': [], 'country': 'China', 'start_time': '20160412_143518_928962', 'log_location':
'sessions/n$
2016-04-12 14:35:18-0500 [-] [PRE_AUTH] - CLIENT CONNECTED, REPLAYING BUFFERED
PACKETS
2016-04-12 14:35:19-0500 [HonsshServerTransport,3442,121.12.127.94] NEW KEYS
2016-04-12 14:35:19-0500 [HonsshServerTransport,3442,121.12.127.94] [PLUGIN][EXAMPLE] {'honey_port': '22', 'sensor_name': 'node2', 'session': {'auths': [], 'country': 'China', 'start_time':
'20160412_1435$
2016-04-12 14:35:19-0500 [HonsshClientTransport,client] [PLUGIN][EXAMPLE] - {'honey_port': '22',
'sensor_name': 'node2', 'session': {'auths': [], 'country': 'China', 'start_time':
'20160412_143518_928962', $
2016-04-12 14:35:20-0500 [HonsshServerTransport,3442,121.12.127.94] [PLUGIN][EXAMPLE] {'honey_port': '22', 'sensor_name': 'node2', 'session': {'auths': [], 'country': 'China', 'start_time':
'20160412_1435$
2016-04-12 14:35:20-0500 [HonsshServerTransport,3442,121.12.127.94] [PLUGIN][HONEYPOTSCRIPT] - GET_POST_AUTH_DETAILS
2016-04-12 14:35:20-0500 [-] [POST_AUTH] - SUCCESS = FALSE, NOT POST-AUTHING
2016-04-12 14:35:20-0500 [-] [PLUGIN][EXAMPLE] - {'honey_port': '22', 'sensor_name': 'node2',
'session': {'auths': [], 'country': 'China', 'start_time': '20160412_143518_928962', 'log_location':
'sessions/n$
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2016-04-12 14:35:22-0500 [HonsshClientTransport,client] [PLUGIN][EXAMPLE] - {'honey_port': '22',
'sensor_name': 'node2', 'session': {'auths': [], 'country': 'China', 'start_time':
'20160412_143518_928962', $
2016-04-12 14:35:22-0500 [HonsshClientTransport,client] [PLUGIN][EXAMPLE] - {'honey_port': '22',
'sensor_name': 'node2', 'session': {'auths': [], 'country': 'China', 'start_time':
'20160412_143518_928962', $
2016-04-12 14:35:22-0500 [HonsshClientTransport,client] [SSH] - Detected Public Key Auth Disabling!
2016-04-12 14:35:22-0500 [HonsshClientTransport,client] [PLUGIN][OUTPUT-TXTLOG] LOGIN_FAILED
2016-04-12 14:35:22-0500 [HonsshClientTransport,client] [PLUGIN][EXAMPLE] - LOGIN_FAILED
2016-04-12 14:35:22-0500 [HonsshClientTransport,client] [PLUGIN][EXAMPLE] - {'honey_port': '22',
'sensor_name': 'node2', 'session': {'country': 'China', 'start_time': '20160412_143518_928962',
'log_location$
2016-04-12 14:35:22-0500 [HonsshServerTransport,3442,121.12.127.94] [PLUGIN][EXAMPLE] {'honey_port': '22', 'sensor_name': 'node2', 'session': {'auths': [{'username': 'root', 'date_time':
'20160412_143522_$
2016-04-12 14:35:22-0500 [HonsshServerTransport,3442,121.12.127.94] [PLUGIN][HONEYPOTSCRIPT] - GET_POST_AUTH_DETAILS
2016-04-12 14:35:22-0500 [-] [POST_AUTH] - SUCCESS = FALSE, NOT POST-AUTHING
2016-04-12 14:35:22-0500 [-] [POST_AUTH] - Spoofing Password
2016-04-12 14:35:22-0500 [-] [PLUGIN][EXAMPLE] - {'honey_port': '22', 'sensor_name': 'node2',
'session': {'auths': [{'username': 'root', 'date_time': '20160412_143522_496430', 'spoofed': False,
'password': $
2016-04-12 14:35:24-0500 [HonsshClientTransport,client] [PLUGIN][EXAMPLE] - {'honey_port': '22',
'sensor_name': 'node2', 'session': {'auths': [{'username': 'root', 'date_time': '20160412_143522_496430',
'sp$
2016-04-12 14:35:24-0500 [HonsshClientTransport,client] [SSH] - Detected Public Key Auth Disabling!
2016-04-12 14:35:24-0500 [HonsshClientTransport,client] [PLUGIN][OUTPUT-TXTLOG] LOGIN_FAILED
2016-04-12 14:35:24-0500 [HonsshClientTransport,client] [PLUGIN][EXAMPLE] - LOGIN_FAILED
2016-04-12 14:35:24-0500 [HonsshClientTransport,client] [PLUGIN][EXAMPLE] - {'honey_port': '22',
'sensor_name': 'node2', 'session': {'country': 'China', 'start_time': '20160412_143518_928962',
'log_location$
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2016-04-12 14:35:25-0500 [HonsshServerTransport,3442,121.12.127.94] [PLUGIN][EXAMPLE] {'honey_port': '22', 'sensor_name': 'node2', 'session': {'auths': [{'username': 'root', 'date_time':
'20160412_143522_$
2016-04-12 14:35:25-0500 [HonsshServerTransport,3442,121.12.127.94] [PLUGIN][HONEYPOTSCRIPT] - GET_POST_AUTH_DETAILS
2016-04-12 14:35:25-0500 [-] [POST_AUTH] - SUCCESS = FALSE, NOT POST-AUTHING
2016-04-12 14:35:25-0500 [-] [POST_AUTH] - Spoofing Password
2016-04-12 14:35:25-0500 [-] [PLUGIN][EXAMPLE] - {'honey_port': '22', 'sensor_name': 'node2',
'session': {'auths': [{'username': 'root', 'date_time': '20160412_143522_496430', 'spoofed': False,
'password': $
2016-04-12 14:35:27-0500 [HonsshClientTransport,client] [PLUGIN][EXAMPLE] - {'honey_port': '22',
'sensor_name': 'node2', 'session': {'auths': [{'username': 'root', 'date_time': '20160412_143522_496430',
'sp$
2016-04-12 14:35:27-0500 [HonsshClientTransport,client] [SSH] - Detected Public Key Auth Disabling!
2016-04-12 14:35:27-0500 [HonsshClientTransport,client] [PLUGIN][OUTPUT-TXTLOG] LOGIN_FAILED
2016-04-12 14:35:27-0500 [HonsshClientTransport,client] [PLUGIN][EXAMPLE] - LOGIN_FAILED
2016-04-12 14:35:27-0500 [HonsshClientTransport,client] [PLUGIN][EXAMPLE] - {'honey_port': '22',
'sensor_name': 'node2', 'session': {'country': 'China', 'start_time': '20160412_143518_928962',
'log_location$
2016-04-12 14:35:27-0500 [HonsshServerTransport,3442,121.12.127.94] [PLUGIN][EXAMPLE] {'honey_port': '22', 'sensor_name': 'node2', 'session': {'auths': [{'username': 'root', 'date_time':
'20160412_143522_$
2016-04-12 14:35:27-0500 [HonsshServerTransport,3442,121.12.127.94] [PLUGIN][HONEYPOTSCRIPT] - GET_POST_AUTH_DETAILS
2016-04-12 14:35:27-0500 [-] [POST_AUTH] - SUCCESS = FALSE, NOT POST-AUTHING
2016-04-12 14:35:27-0500 [-] [POST_AUTH] - Spoofing Password

